Le conflit à Aceh : obstacle majeur à la mise en œuvre des secours

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This briefing argues that the Indonesian army's dominant role in coordinating tsunami relief in Aceh is problematic due to its history of human rights abuses and continued military operations, which undermine trust and impartial aid distribution.

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  • The conflict between the Indonesian army and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which began in 1976 and resulted in an estimated 12,000 deaths, has left the Aceh region closed to foreigners for two years prior to the tsunami.
  • The Indonesian army has increased its presence in Aceh to nearly 45,000 men following the tsunami, with one-third of these forces dedicated to security operations and two-thirds to humanitarian efforts, aiming to maintain its dominance in the region.
  • Multinational corporations, such as Exxon Mobil, Newmont, and Unocal, have interests in Aceh's oil and gas reserves; Exxon Mobil specifically faces legal action in the US for allegedly using the Indonesian army to protect its interests through human rights atrocities.
  • Radical Islamist groups like the Front of Defenders of Islam and Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) are using the post-tsunami context to expand their influence and spread suspicions that Western international aid is a cover for Christianization.
  • The local population's rejection of the central government is driven by army brutality, systemic underdevelopment compared to Java, and the fact that Aceh's natural gas reserves benefit the state rather than the province.
  • International civil society views the Indonesian army as an inappropriate coordinator for reconstruction due to a deep lack of trust from the local population, continued military operations despite ceasefire proposals, and restrictions on civilian humanitarians and foreign press.

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APA
CCFD-Terre solidaire (2005). Le conflit à Aceh : obstacle majeur à la mise en œuvre des secours. https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2005/06/conflit_a_acadc9-2.pdf
Chicago
CCFD-Terre solidaire. Le conflit à Aceh : obstacle majeur à la mise en œuvre des secours. 2005. https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2005/06/conflit_a_acadc9-2.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=CCFD-Terre solidaire |title=Le conflit à Aceh : obstacle majeur à la mise en œuvre des secours |date=28 January 2005 |url=https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2005/06/conflit_a_acadc9-2.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ccfdts-001067)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{ccfdterresolidaire2005conflit, author = {{CCFD-Terre solidaire}}, title = {{Le conflit à Aceh : obstacle majeur à la mise en œuvre des secours}}, institution = {CCFD-Terre solidaire}, year = {2005}, month = jan, url = {https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2005/06/conflit_a_acadc9-2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ccfdts-001067} }

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