B r è v e h i s t o i r e d ’ u n e transition singulière

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This report examines the 2014-2016 transition in the Central African Republic, finding that the process was largely co-managed by international actors and characterized by the persistence of elite predation and a failure to achieve genuine social reconciliation.

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  • The transition in the Central African Republic was not an endogenous process but was co-managed by national authorities and a group of international representatives known as the G-8, including the UN, AU, EU, France, the US, and the World Bank.
  • The Séléka coalition lacked organic or ideological unity, functioning instead as a constellation of armed groups often organized on ethnic bases, where obedience to leadership required recurring rewards.
  • The Anti-Balaka emerged as a social movement and self-defense group, initially targeting Peul/Foulani populations due to traditional conflicts between farmers and herders and the ability to resell livestock.
  • The election of Catherine Samba-Panza as transitional president was heavily influenced by French diplomatic pressure, with the French ambassador actively campaigning for her candidacy to the National Transition Council (CNT).
  • The transitional government was characterized by clientelism and a lack of qualification, with many appointments based on proximity to the president rather than technical competence.
  • The 'Angolagate' incident involved the misappropriation of a $10 million aid package from Angola in March 2014, where funds were exchanged in Douala and a significant portion disappeared without justification.
  • International actors, particularly France and the UN, prioritized the rapid holding of elections over deep social reconciliation, often tolerating the criminalization of armed groups in exchange for a secure electoral environment.
  • The 2015 Bangui Forum, while innovative in giving a voice to provincial delegates, resulted in recommendations that did not fundamentally differ from previous exercises and was marred by the president's marginal role in the final agreement.

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APA
MARCHAL, R. (2016). B r è v e h i s t o i r e d ’ u n e transition singulière. CCFD-Terre solidaire. https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/bre_ve_histoire_de_la_transition_en_rca_impression_1_.pdf
Chicago
MARCHAL, Roland. B r è v e h i s t o i r e d ’ u n e transition singulière. CCFD-Terre solidaire, 2016. https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/bre_ve_histoire_de_la_transition_en_rca_impression_1_.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=MARCHAL |first1=Roland |title=B r è v e h i s t o i r e d ’ u n e transition singulière |publisher=CCFD-Terre solidaire |date=September 2016 |url=https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/bre_ve_histoire_de_la_transition_en_rca_impression_1_.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document ccfdts-000828)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{marchal2016transition, author = {MARCHAL, Roland}, title = {{B r è v e h i s t o i r e d ’ u n e transition singulière}}, institution = {CCFD-Terre solidaire}, year = {2016}, month = sep, url = {https://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/bre_ve_histoire_de_la_transition_en_rca_impression_1_.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document ccfdts-000828} }

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