Financing Nuclear Energy in Poland

The report argues that Poland should adopt a technology-neutral, long-term energy strategy that includes nuclear power to achieve a zero-carbon economy by 2050. It emphasizes that because the cost of capital is a primary driver of final electricity costs, the Polish government must play a central role in de-risking projects. The document specifically analyzes Contracts for Difference (CfDs) as a primary state aid mechanism to stabilize revenues, while cautioning that CfDs do not address construction risks. Drawing on UK case studies, it contrasts the Hinkley Point C project, which suffered from cost overruns and lack of construction risk-sharing, with the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model used for Sizewell C, which lowers the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) by sharing risks with consumers. The report concludes that Poland must ensure high transparency in financial governance to maintain public support.

• Poland aims to transition to a zero-carbon economy by 2050, with nuclear energy identified as a key component of this transition.
• The cost of capital is a critical factor in the economic feasibility of nuclear projects, with the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) typically ranging between 3.8% and 7%.
• Contracts for Difference (CfDs) are a primary EU-endorsed state aid mechanism that stabilizes income by paying producers the difference between a fixed 'strike price' and the market price, though they only provide support once a plant is operational.
• The Hinkley Point C project in the UK demonstrates that CfDs do not protect investors from construction risks, such as delays and cost overruns, which can lead to a decline in private investor interest.
• The Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model used for the Sizewell C project in the UK significantly reduces the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) by sharing construction risks with consumers via energy bills.
• The European Union is shifting toward supporting nuclear energy to bolster energy independence, as evidenced by the inclusion of nuclear energy in the EU Taxonomy and the launch of the European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).
• To maintain high public acceptance, Poland must be transparent about the financial assumptions and government support mechanisms of its nuclear projects.

APA

Clean Air Task Force (n.d.). Financing Nuclear Energy in Poland. https://cdn.catf.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/09082114/financing-nuclear-energy-poland.pdf

Chicago

Clean Air Task Force. Financing Nuclear Energy in Poland. n.d. https://cdn.catf.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/09082114/financing-nuclear-energy-poland.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Clean Air Task Force |title=Financing Nuclear Energy in Poland |url=https://cdn.catf.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/09082114/financing-nuclear-energy-poland.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{cleanairtaskforcendfinancing, author = {{Clean Air Task Force}}, title = {{Financing Nuclear Energy in Poland}}, institution = {Clean Air Task Force}, url = {https://cdn.catf.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/09082114/financing-nuclear-energy-poland.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }