The Promise and Peril of Threat Politics
Summary
The paper examines 'threat politics,' distinguishing between 'threat inflation' (knowingly exaggerating a threat) and 'threat emphasis' (good-faith appeals to fear). It argues that while these tactics can unify a polity, secure policy wins, and signal resolve, they often lead to counterproductive outcomes such as increased xenophobia, bureaucratic entrapment, and diplomatic alienation. Applying this to China, the author notes a growing bipartisan consensus on the threat but warns of a 'race to the bottom' in rhetoric. Regarding climate change, the author finds that fear-based framing is often ineffective due to the problem's complexity and extreme partisan polarization, suggesting a shift toward 'economic opportunity' frames.
Key insights
- Threat politics is categorized into two distinct phenomena: 'threat inflation,' which involves knowingly exaggerating a threat's magnitude for persuasion, and 'threat emphasis' (or 'threat invocation'), which is the good-faith attempt to elevate a genuinely perceived massive threat in public consciousness.
- The potential benefits of threat politics include unifying a divided public through a common social identity, securing legislative or executive action, achieving 'linked policy victories' for tangentially related priorities, gaining electoral advantages, and signaling resolve to foreign partners and adversaries.
- Threat politics can incur significant costs, including the creation of short-lived or destructive unity, the fueling of racism and xenophobia, and 'entrapment,' where policymakers are boxed in by their own rhetoric and cannot dial back the threat without losing credibility.
- In the case of China, there is a 'dual convergence' of views across the executive, congressional, and public spheres, making the China threat a powerful tool for policymakers to overcome polarization or pass legislation like the CHIPS and Science Act.
- The use of threat politics regarding China risks increasing anti-Asian hate crimes and alienating international partners who do not wish to be forced to choose between the United States and China.
- Threat politics has been largely ineffective for climate change because the problem's enormity can breed apathy, and the issue is deeply polarized along partisan lines, meaning fear-based appeals often trigger opposing threat politics from political rivals.
- While general fear appeals fail for climate change, framing it as a national security issue has occasionally provided 'political cover' for Republicans to support specific climate-related defense measures.
- The author recommends that policymakers avoid deliberate threat inflation and instead explore alternative motivating logics, such as 'economic opportunity' frames, to persuade the public and achieve policy goals with fewer risks.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Rosenberg, B. (2025). The Promise and Peril of Threat Politics. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Rosenberg_Threat%20Politics.pdf
- Chicago
- Rosenberg, Brett. The Promise and Peril of Threat Politics. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Rosenberg_Threat%20Politics.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Rosenberg |first1=Brett |title=The Promise and Peril of Threat Politics |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=July 2025 |url=https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Rosenberg_Threat%20Politics.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-003302)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{rosenberg2025promise, author = {Rosenberg, Brett}, title = {{The Promise and Peril of Threat Politics}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2025}, month = jul, url = {https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Rosenberg_Threat%20Politics.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-003302} }
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