Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?

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The author contends that current nuclear postures in the US and Russia, focused on escalation dominance, are abnormal and dangerously excessive. He proposes two initiatives: commissioning scientific studies on the climatic effects of nuclear war (specifically nuclear winter) and requiring nuclear-armed states to clarify how their arsenals and plans adhere to international humanitarian law. The paper suggests that 'accountable deterrents'—potentially limited to around 300 weapons with low yields—could maintain security while reducing the risk of global catastrophe, with China potentially serving as a pivotal player in leading this shift.

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  • The author argues that the central question for nuclear-armed states should shift from determining the minimum force necessary for deterrence ("How much is enough?") to identifying the threshold beyond which arsenals become too likely to cause global catastrophe ("How much is too much?").
  • The paper proposes an initiative for nuclear-armed states to commission scientific studies to determine how changes in the number, yield, and targeting of nuclear weapons could reduce the probability of a 'nuclear winter' that would threaten global food supplies and the environment.
  • A second proposed initiative would require nuclear-armed states to publicly clarify whether and how they intend to adhere to international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of armed conflict (LOAC) during nuclear operations.
  • The author asserts that the nuclear arsenals and operational plans of the United States and Russia are 'abnormal' compared to other nuclear-armed states, noting that the two countries possess 92 percent of the world's nuclear weapons.
  • The document argues that the pursuit of 'escalation dominance'—the ability to win exchanges at every level of conflict—leads to destabilizing arms races and increases the risk that a conflict will escalate to global nuclear war.
  • The author suggests that 'accountable deterrents' could be heuristically based on approximately 300 weapons with the lowest necessary yields, arguing that such low numbers have historically been sufficient for other nuclear-armed states to avoid major aggression.
  • China is identified as a potentially pivotal player that could gain international soft power by leading an effort to limit the destructiveness of nuclear war and encouraging the US and Russia to reduce their forces to Chinese levels.
  • The author contends that complete nuclear disarmament is currently infeasible and that focusing solely on 'zero' serves as a diversion that allows advocates of escalation dominance to ignore the dangers of the status quo.

Cite the original document

APA
Perkovich, G. (2020). Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Perkovich_Accountable_Nuclear.pdf
Chicago
Perkovich, George. Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Perkovich_Accountable_Nuclear.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Perkovich |first1=George |title=Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much? |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=February 2020 |url=https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Perkovich_Accountable_Nuclear.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-003270)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{perkovich2020toward, author = {Perkovich, George}, title = {{Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2020}, month = feb, url = {https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Perkovich_Accountable_Nuclear.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-003270} }

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