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This report concludes that 'quid pro quo' bargains between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states are failing because the latter view disarmament promises as long overdue. It argues that U.S. leadership in nonproliferation can only be reclaimed if the U.S. first sends serious signals of commitment to disarmament.

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  • Nuclear-weapon states' attempts to secure support for nonproliferation through 'quid pro quo' bargains are failing because non-nuclear-weapon states view these as unfair exchanges given unfulfilled disarmament promises.
  • Non-nuclear-weapon states generally believe that progress on disarmament is a necessary, though not always sufficient, prerequisite for them to consider further nonproliferation commitments.
  • Stockpile reductions alone are insufficient to restore U.S. credibility; non-nuclear-weapon states prioritize a reduced role for nuclear weapons in military doctrine and a general commitment to disarmament over simple numerical cuts.
  • There is a pervasive atmosphere of mistrust between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states, driven by the slow pace of disarmament and the perception that nuclear-weapon states view their arsenals as a 'permanent right'.
  • The 13 Steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference remain the primary benchmarks for disarmament progress, although there is debate among non-nuclear-weapon states on whether they should be updated or strictly adhered to.
  • Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are viewed by a broad consensus of non-nuclear-weapon states as the most powerful signals the U.S. could send to demonstrate disarmament seriousness.
  • Non-nuclear-weapon states are highly sensitive to fuel-cycle initiatives, fearing that proposals to voluntarily forego enrichment and reprocessing capabilities infringe upon their NPT Article IV rights to peaceful nuclear energy.
  • The United States' leadership in the nonproliferation regime has eroded, which the author argues imperils U.S. national security by weakening the institutional foundations of the global order.

Cite the original document

APA
Choubey, D. (2008). ARE NEW NUCLEAR BARGAINS ATTAINABLE? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/new_nuclear_bargains.pdf
Chicago
Choubey, Deepti. ARE NEW NUCLEAR BARGAINS ATTAINABLE? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/new_nuclear_bargains.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Choubey |first1=Deepti |title=ARE NEW NUCLEAR BARGAINS ATTAINABLE? |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=2008 |url=http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/new_nuclear_bargains.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-003212)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{choubey2008are, author = {Choubey, Deepti}, title = {{ARE NEW NUCLEAR BARGAINS ATTAINABLE?}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2008}, url = {http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/new_nuclear_bargains.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-003212} }

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