The Hormuz Conflict and the Limits of Renminbi Internationalization
Summary
This research paper argues that despite Beijing's ambitions and the catalyst of the Strait of Hormuz conflict, structural obstacles—including limited access to liquid renminbi assets and immature derivatives markets—continue to constrain the renminbi's global role in energy trade.
Key insights
- The renminbi's global use in energy trade remains limited; in 2024, renminbi-settled trade in goods across the Middle East represented less than 10% of the dollar-value of trade between China and the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.
- While CIPS transaction volumes spiked in early 2026 due to the Strait of Hormuz conflict, these increases were likely driven by financial transactions rather than trade, and RMB CHATS volumes actually trended downward compared to 2024 and 2025.
- The lack of deep and liquid renminbi-denominated financial assets available to foreign investors is a major structural barrier; foreign holdings of onshore renminbi bonds and equities were approximately $1 trillion in mid-2025, compared to over $33 trillion in foreign-held US equities and long-term debt.
- The offshore renminbi derivatives market is too shallow to allow global users to effectively hedge exchange rate risk, which specifically hinders the currency's use in oil transactions.
- China's central bank swap lines are primarily used by emerging market economies facing sovereign debt or foreign exchange crises, and their effectiveness in promoting trade payments is modest.
- The attractiveness of the renminbi for non-Chinese parties depends heavily on its convertibility into dollars, meaning US authorities maintain significant leverage over renminbi financial channels, especially for countries with dollar-pegged currencies.
- In the Middle East, renminbi usage is concentrated in Qatar and the UAE, but these transactions are predominantly investment flows; only 18% of 2024 Middle East-China renminbi-settled transactions were trade-related.
- Iran's use of the renminbi for oil exports is a necessity driven by US sanctions, but the regime still goes to great lengths to illicitly obtain dollars and euros, sometimes at a cost of 30 to 50 percent of the oil's market price.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Greene, R. (2026). The Hormuz Conflict and the Limits of Renminbi Internationalization. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/files/Greene%20-%20The%20Hormuz%20Conflict%20and%20the%20Limits%20of%20Renminbi%20Internationalization%20Paper-V9.pdf
- Chicago
- Greene, Robert. The Hormuz Conflict and the Limits of Renminbi Internationalization. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2026. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/files/Greene%20-%20The%20Hormuz%20Conflict%20and%20the%20Limits%20of%20Renminbi%20Internationalization%20Paper-V9.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Greene |first1=Robert |title=The Hormuz Conflict and the Limits of Renminbi Internationalization |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=July 2026 |url=https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/files/Greene%20-%20The%20Hormuz%20Conflict%20and%20the%20Limits%20of%20Renminbi%20Internationalization%20Paper-V9.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-003039)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{greene2026hormuz, author = {Greene, Robert}, title = {{The Hormuz Conflict and the Limits of Renminbi Internationalization}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2026}, month = jul, url = {https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/files/Greene%20-%20The%20Hormuz%20Conflict%20and%20the%20Limits%20of%20Renminbi%20Internationalization%20Paper-V9.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-003039} }
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