CHINA, INDIA, AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL ORDER
Summary
The report analyzes the geopolitical and strategic outlooks of China and India as they rise as global powers. It finds that while both nations broadly agree on the importance of state sovereignty, the need for reform in international financial institutions, and the challenges of energy and environmental security, they are deeply divided on issues of regional security in Asia and Southern Asia, the nonproliferation system, and the management of the global commons (maritime, space, and cyberspace). The analysis suggests that a deep-rooted bilateral rivalry often outweighs their shared interests vis-à-vis the West, complicating the future of the international system and the United States' role in the Asia-Pacific.
Key insights
- China and India share a commitment to state sovereignty and the reform of global governance institutions to reflect the current balance of power, yet they diverge on the role of individual rights and civil society. China views the trend toward a liberalized society as "politically incorrect and unacceptable" and prioritizes sovereign rights over individual rights, whereas India has begun adapting to the empowerment of its citizenry through legal rights and a welfare state.
- Both nations support an open, rule-based international economic order but seek greater representation in financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank. A significant point of divergence is the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); China argues that SOEs can be reformed to harmonize with the global system, while India contends that the emergence of state-owned capitalist enterprises invalidates the premise that the multilateral trading order is based on private enterprises.
- China and India hold starkly different views on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China views the NPT as the "cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation system" and has reconciled itself to the regime since 1992. India, however, views the NPT as fundamentally discriminatory and "frozen … in time and space," arguing that it divides states into nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon categories.
- In Asian security, China and India perceive threats differently. China's primary concerns are the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, and the Iranian nuclear program, often viewing U.S. involvement as a complication. India focuses on unresolved territorial disputes, terrorism, and economic growth, and seeks a resolute U.S. presence in the region to hedge against Chinese excesses.
- Regarding the maritime commons, both countries support the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the foundation for global maritime order. However, they disagree with the U.S. interpretation of military activities in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). China views U.S. naval activity in its EEZ as an abuse of the "freedom of navigation" to collect maritime data, while India maintains a more cooperative relationship with the U.S. Navy.
- In space security, China's program is predominantly military from the start, integrating civilian and military dimensions. India's program has been primarily civilian, only recently developing military support capabilities and retaliatory options, largely as a "knee-jerk reaction" to China's 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test.
- On cybersecurity, both nations view cyberspace as a "central nervous system" and prioritize its security, but they differ on Internet freedom. China employs sophisticated censorship to maintain political stability, while India's efforts to constrain online speech face significant domestic public pushback due to its democratic nature.
- Energy security for both nations involves a heavy reliance on foreign suppliers and a continued dependence on coal. China emphasizes self-reliance and indigenous sources, while India's primary concern is ensuring universal access to energy at competitive prices for its population.
- On environmental issues, China and India both prioritize economic growth but acknowledge the severity of pollution. They strongly advocate for the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (CBDR) in global climate agreements, arguing that developed nations must shoulder the burden of historical emissions before emerging economies take on onerous responsibilities.
- The bilateral relationship between China and India is characterized by a deep-rooted geopolitical rivalry and mutual distrust, which often prevents practical cooperation on global issues. This rivalry is exacerbated by territorial disputes and China's close strategic partnership with Pakistan.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2013). CHINA, INDIA, AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL ORDER. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/crux_of_asia.pdf
- Chicago
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. CHINA, INDIA, AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL ORDER. 2013. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/crux_of_asia.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |author=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |title=CHINA, INDIA, AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL ORDER |date=2013 |url=https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/crux_of_asia.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-002755)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{carnegieendowmentforinternationalpeace2013china, author = {{Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}}, title = {{CHINA, INDIA, AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL ORDER}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2013}, url = {https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/crux_of_asia.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-002755} }
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