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This report analyzes the geopolitical risks facing Europe's undersea data infrastructure, finding that while Europe leads in cable installation, it lacks the strategic coordination and investment needed to protect against hybrid threats from Russia and China and the market dominance of U.S. hyperscalers.

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  • Europe's subsea cable infrastructure is highly vulnerable to sabotage, as demonstrated by the 2022 Nord Stream explosion and the 2023 Balticconnector incident, as well as November 2024 damages to cables connecting Finland-Germany and Sweden-Lithuania.
  • Russia is actively mapping critical subsea infrastructure of NATO allies and has used vessels like the Yantar intelligence ship to patrol areas where data cables and energy pipelines connect Ireland with Great Britain.
  • China poses a growing risk to European infrastructure, evidenced by the 2023 Balticconnector incident involving the Hong Kong-flagged vessel Newnew Polar Bear and the 2024 suspected involvement of the Yi Peng 3 in Baltic Sea cable cuts.
  • Existing international legal frameworks, specifically the 1884 Cable Convention and UNCLOS, are inadequate for the era of hybrid aggression because they lack effective penalties and rely on flag-state jurisdiction rather than the jurisdiction of the impacted countries.
  • While France's Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN) is a global leader in installation, Europe lacks competitors to U.S. 'hyperscalers' (Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft), who accounted for nearly a quarter of cable systems starting operation between 2019 and 2023.
  • Europe faces a critical shortage of cable repair vessels with icebreaking capabilities, meaning no Western cable-laying or repair ships can currently operate autonomously in areas with heavy sea ice in the Arctic.
  • The EU's CEF Digital funding for backbone connectivity projects is often spread too thin across many projects rather than focusing on a few strategically important ones, risking the failure of projects with high geopolitical significance.
  • NATO has established the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure in the UK and a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell in Brussels to synchronize efforts between governments and the private sector.

Cite the original document

APA
Besch, S., & Brown, E. (2024). Securing Europe’s Subsea Data Cables. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Besch%20Brown-Europe%20Subsea%20Cables.pdf
Chicago
Besch, Sophia, and Erik Brown. Securing Europe’s Subsea Data Cables. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Besch%20Brown-Europe%20Subsea%20Cables.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Besch |first1=Sophia |last2=Brown |first2=Erik |title=Securing Europe’s Subsea Data Cables |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=December 2024 |url=https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Besch%20Brown-Europe%20Subsea%20Cables.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-002538)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{besch2024securing, author = {Besch, Sophia and Brown, Erik}, title = {{Securing Europe’s Subsea Data Cables}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2024}, month = dec, url = {https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/Besch%20Brown-Europe%20Subsea%20Cables.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-002538} }

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