پاکستان اور چین مذاکرات کیسے کرتے ہیں

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The paper argues that CPEC is not a unilateral Chinese imposition but a product of negotiation where Pakistan has successfully exercised agency to align projects with its own political and economic priorities. A key finding is that China has adapted its strategies to accommodate Pakistan's internal political transitions, such as the shift from the PML-N to the PTI government in 2018.

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  • The selection of CPEC's eastern route was a result of alignment between Chinese technical preferences and the political interests of the Pakistan Muslim League (N), which prioritized development in Punjab and Sindh to secure electoral gains.
  • Energy projects, particularly coal-fired power plants, were prioritized in the first phase of CPEC primarily due to Pakistan's internal energy crisis and the PML-N's goal of eliminating electricity shortages before the 2018 elections.
  • The development of Gwadar Port was a long-standing Pakistani priority initiated as early as 2000 by President Pervez Musharraf, rather than a purely Chinese strategic imposition.
  • The selection of the Rashakai SEZ demonstrates Pakistani agency over economic logic, as China accepted this site despite it being less viable than other options because of the PTI government's political insistence.
  • Progress on SEZs has been slow due to bureaucratic complexity, a lack of 'one-window' operations, and a failure to provide a business environment that attracts private Chinese investment.
  • While China has funded social projects in Gwadar to mitigate security risks and appease local communities, many of these projects were later removed from the official CPEC website or the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) under the PTI government.
  • Local fishing communities in Gwadar have expressed significant concerns that Chinese trawlers and CPEC infrastructure are destroying their livelihoods and depleting fish stocks.

Cite the original document

APA
ایڈنی, ک., & بونی, ف. (2021). پاکستان اور چین مذاکرات کیسے کرتے ہیں. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/202105-Adeney_Boni_Pakistan_and_China_Urdu.pdf
Chicago
ایڈنی, کیتھرین, and فلیپو بونی. پاکستان اور چین مذاکرات کیسے کرتے ہیں. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021. https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/202105-Adeney_Boni_Pakistan_and_China_Urdu.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=ایڈنی |first1=کیتھرین |last2=بونی |first2=فلیپو |title=پاکستان اور چین مذاکرات کیسے کرتے ہیں |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=May 2021 |url=https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/202105-Adeney_Boni_Pakistan_and_China_Urdu.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-002438)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{2021, author = {ایڈنی, کیتھرین and بونی, فلیپو}, title = {{پاکستان اور چین مذاکرات کیسے کرتے ہیں}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2021}, month = may, url = {https://assets.carnegieendowment.org/static/files/202105-Adeney_Boni_Pakistan_and_China_Urdu.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-002438} }

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