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This research paper argues that Russia's reliance on post-Soviet emission declines to justify its climate inaction is no longer credible, urging the country to adopt domestic emission targets and a more substantive diplomatic strategy to avoid remaining on the outskirts of international climate policy.

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  • Russia's historical emission reductions since 1990 were primarily the result of economic collapse following the Soviet Union's fall, rather than focused climate policies, making its claim of being a global leader in mitigation efforts unconvincing to the international community.
  • Despite emissions remaining below 1990 levels, Russia's carbon intensity in 2010 was 81 percent above the global average, and its per capita emissions were nearly three times the world average, making it the most energy-intensive economy among G20 countries.
  • Russia faces significant climate risks, including rising temperatures that are increasing twice as fast as the global average, leading to droughts in agricultural cores, forest fires, and melting permafrost that threatens infrastructure and energy projects in the north.
  • Russia's participation in the Kyoto Protocol was delayed and primarily motivated by the desire for financial gain through the sale of assigned amount units (AAUs) and diplomatic leverage over WTO accession, rather than a commitment to mitigation.
  • The Russian government has announced several mitigation policies, such as a 40 percent reduction in energy intensity by 2020 and a 2009 Climate Doctrine, but these remain largely unimplemented or lack concrete measures.
  • Russia decided not to enter the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, preferring a new global agreement that includes all major emitters, but this is viewed as a rhetoric-driven approach to postpone future commitments.
  • A domestic emissions trading scheme (ETS) is considered unlikely to be supported by the Russian leadership due to the risk of imposing caps on key industries and high potential for corruption, though a domestic offsetting scheme based on Joint Implementation could be a less risky alternative.

Cite the original document

APA
Корппоо, A. V. А. (2012). A Climate Vision for Russia: From Rhetoric to Action. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2012/10/a-climate-vision-for-russia-from-rhetoric-to-action
Chicago
Корппоо, Adnan Vatansever, Анна. A Climate Vision for Russia: From Rhetoric to Action. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2012/10/a-climate-vision-for-russia-from-rhetoric-to-action.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Корппоо |first1=Adnan Vatansever, Анна |title=A Climate Vision for Russia: From Rhetoric to Action |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=1 August 2012 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2012/10/a-climate-vision-for-russia-from-rhetoric-to-action |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-002134)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{2012climate, author = {Корппоо, Adnan Vatansever, Анна}, title = {{A Climate Vision for Russia: From Rhetoric to Action}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2012}, month = aug, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2012/10/a-climate-vision-for-russia-from-rhetoric-to-action}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-002134} }

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