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This research paper argues that China's lending in Central Asia is flexible rather than a uniform 'debt-trap' strategy, with the ability of nations like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to manage debt depending on their own institutional strength.

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  • China's lending approach in Central Asia is flexible and varies by country, contradicting the notion of a one-size-fits-all 'debt-trap' diplomacy; the primary variable determining a country's vulnerability is the strength of its own state institutions.
  • Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan maintain more leverage and manageable debt levels. Kazakhstan's debt to China was $9.2 billion as of January 1, 2024, representing only about 3.5 percent of its GDP. Uzbekistan has mitigated risk by diversifying its lenders, with 36.8 percent of its 2022 debt owed to various national and international financial institutions.
  • Tajikistan is highly compromised due to weak institutions and a lack of political expression, leading it to repay debts through the lease of strategic assets, such as two gold ore deposits used to pay for the Dushanbe-2 thermal power station.
  • Kyrgyzstan faces significant debt pressure, owing $1.7 billion to the Exim Bank at the end of 2023. Unlike Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan cannot easily use natural resource assets for repayment due to high public skepticism and the risk of social unrest, forcing China to be more exacting with interest rates while avoiding asset seizures.
  • While China has signed agreements for green technology and renewable energy projects—including a 1,000-megawatt solar plant in Kyrgyzstan—its actual cooperation remains heavily centered on polluting industries, such as coal. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan brought six coal deposits under Chinese control.
  • China is generally unwilling to forgive debt outright and has expressed skepticism toward 'debt-for-nature swaps,' preferring to extend repayment periods at higher interest rates.

Cite the original document

APA
Feigenbaum, E. A. (2024). China Investment Central Asia Debt. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/09/china-investment-central-asia-debt
Chicago
Feigenbaum, Evan A. China Investment Central Asia Debt. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/09/china-investment-central-asia-debt.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Feigenbaum |first1=Evan A. |title=China Investment Central Asia Debt |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=19 August 2024 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/09/china-investment-central-asia-debt |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001900)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{feigenbaum2024china, author = {Feigenbaum, Evan A.}, title = {{China Investment Central Asia Debt}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2024}, month = aug, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/09/china-investment-central-asia-debt}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001900} }

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