Too Big to Fail: Egypt’s Large Enterprises After the 2011 Uprising
Summary
The document finds that while large Egyptian enterprises lost significant political sway and access to state patronage after the 2011 uprising, their increasing economic autonomy may paradoxically encourage them to advocate for a more transparent, market-oriented institutional environment.
Key insights
- Large private enterprises in Egypt grew in size and significance from the 1990s, becoming less dependent on the state for profits and occupying key positions in vital sectors.
- Between 2004 and 2011, there was a high degree of politicization of big business, where businessmen took active roles in the cabinet and legislature to advance particular interests, often tied to the succession project for Gamal Mubarak.
- Following the 2011 uprising, the political influence of large enterprises was sharply reduced as the National Democratic Party was dissolved and many businessmen were prosecuted for corruption.
- Despite the political backlash, successive governments after 2011, including the military (SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood, recognized that large enterprises were vital for economic growth, investment, and preventing capital flight.
- The regime of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has actively sought to remove big business from direct political involvement and has pushed enterprises into a subservient role, such as requesting financial contributions to the 'Long Live Egypt' fund.
- Since 2013, the Egyptian military has significantly expanded its own economic role, entering sectors like housing and infrastructure, which has diverted public procurement contracts away from large private enterprises.
- The increasing economic autonomy of large enterprises from the state may lead them to move away from cronyism and instead push for a level playing field and greater transparency for the private sector as a whole.
- The government's efforts to reassure investors and improve the business climate after 2013 were largely unsuccessful, with total investment as a percentage of GDP falling from 19.5% in 2010 to 14.2% in 2015.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Adly, A. (2017). Too Big to Fail: Egypt’s Large Enterprises After the 2011 Uprising. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/03/too-big-to-fail-egypts-large-enterprises-after-the-2011-uprising
- Chicago
- Adly, Amr. Too Big to Fail: Egypt’s Large Enterprises After the 2011 Uprising. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/03/too-big-to-fail-egypts-large-enterprises-after-the-2011-uprising.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Adly |first1=Amr |title=Too Big to Fail: Egypt’s Large Enterprises After the 2011 Uprising |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=2 March 2017 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/03/too-big-to-fail-egypts-large-enterprises-after-the-2011-uprising |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001816)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{adly2017too, author = {Adly, Amr}, title = {{Too Big to Fail: Egypt’s Large Enterprises After the 2011 Uprising}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2017}, month = mar, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/03/too-big-to-fail-egypts-large-enterprises-after-the-2011-uprising}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001816} }
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