Congress, Preempt State AI Law, the Lessons of Past Technologies

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This research paper analyzes the history of federal preemption of emerging technologies to argue that the U.S. should adopt a nuanced, incremental approach to AI governance rather than a blanket ban on state-level regulation.

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  • Historically, Congress has preempted state laws on emerging technologies to achieve three primary goals: preventing industry fragmentation from conflicting laws, stopping outlier states from imposing their rules nationally, or leveraging federal expertise for national security.
  • Federal preemption typically occurs when a bipartisan compromise is reached between pro-regulatory groups and industry coalitions that prefer a single federal rule over a patchwork of state requirements, usually after conflicting laws appear but before they are deeply entrenched.
  • The case for federal uniformity is strongest in the development of foundation models because this sector is a national market characterized by significant economies of scale, high up-front costs, and homogeneous goods.
  • Current state-level AI regulation has not yet created the 'chaos' of conflicting laws feared by preemption advocates; most of the 107 AI-related laws passed by 41 states in 2024 were narrowly scoped, focusing on specific use-cases like political advertising or nonconsensual sexual imagery.
  • Colorado's AI Act is currently the most comprehensive state-level regulation imposing requirements on developers of systems used for 'consequential' decisions, but it has not yet become a de facto national standard as other states have declined to follow suit.
  • Federal intervention is most appropriate for governing general-purpose AI models and extreme risks, such as the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, because the federal government is better positioned to attract and retain the necessary technical talent.

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APA
Phillips-Robins, Y. F. A. (2025). Congress, Preempt State AI Law, the Lessons of Past Technologies. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/congress-preempt-state-ai-law-the-lessons-of-past-technologies
Chicago
Phillips-Robins, Yiqin Fu, Alasdair. Congress, Preempt State AI Law, the Lessons of Past Technologies. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/congress-preempt-state-ai-law-the-lessons-of-past-technologies.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Phillips-Robins |first1=Yiqin Fu, Alasdair |title=Congress, Preempt State AI Law, the Lessons of Past Technologies |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=9 September 2025 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/congress-preempt-state-ai-law-the-lessons-of-past-technologies |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001678)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{phillipsrobins2025congress, author = {Phillips-Robins, Yiqin Fu, Alasdair}, title = {{Congress, Preempt State AI Law, the Lessons of Past Technologies}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2025}, month = sep, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/congress-preempt-state-ai-law-the-lessons-of-past-technologies}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001678} }

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