Assessing Egypt’s State Ownership Policy: Challenges and Requirements
Summary
This research paper argues that Egypt's State Ownership Policy is a cosmetic effort to attract Gulf investment and satisfy IMF conditions without implementing the deep structural reforms needed to revitalize the private sector or curb military economic expansion.
Key insights
- The Egyptian government's State Ownership Policy (SOP) targets the partial sale of thirty-two state-owned enterprises by March 2024, primarily to attract foreign currency from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) investors to cover a financing gap estimated at some $5 billion by summer 2023.
- The SOP is unlikely to significantly reduce the military's economic influence; only two military-run companies are slated for partial sale, and the military continues to expand into sectors like cement, automotive, and intermediate chemicals.
- Egypt's economic recovery since 2013 has been built on 'nontradable' sectors, specifically construction and real estate, which generate growth and employment but fail to increase exports or reduce imports, thereby maintaining a chronic current account deficit.
- Private investment in Egypt has collapsed from approximately 15 percent of GDP in 2008 to just 2 percent by 2021, indicating a catastrophic lack of private sector commitment and a 'missing middle' syndrome.
- The IMF's projections for Egypt are viewed as inconsistent, as the fund anticipates a growth rate of about 6 percent despite projecting a very low investment rate rise from 12 percent of GDP in 2022 to 14 percent five years later.
- The Egyptian government's preference for 'anchor investors' over initial public offerings (IPOs) prevents the broadening of the shareholder base and fails to integrate small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) into the economy.
- Hydrocarbon downstream sectors in Egypt face a future challenge of shifting to green energy to avoid special levies, such as those in the European Union, on carbon-intensive products like steel, fertilizer, and cement.
- The military's economic activities often result in significant losses borne by the state treasury, such as the $1.2 billion cement factory and livestock-breeding complexes that operate well below capacity.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Sayigh, Y. (2023). Assessing Egypt’s State Ownership Policy: Challenges and Requirements. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/research/2023/05/assessing-egypts-state-ownership-policy-challenges-and-requirements
- Chicago
- Sayigh, Yezid. Assessing Egypt’s State Ownership Policy: Challenges and Requirements. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/research/2023/05/assessing-egypts-state-ownership-policy-challenges-and-requirements.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Sayigh |first1=Yezid |title=Assessing Egypt’s State Ownership Policy: Challenges and Requirements |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=8 May 2023 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/research/2023/05/assessing-egypts-state-ownership-policy-challenges-and-requirements |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001293)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{sayigh2023assessing, author = {Sayigh, Yezid}, title = {{Assessing Egypt’s State Ownership Policy: Challenges and Requirements}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2023}, month = may, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/research/2023/05/assessing-egypts-state-ownership-policy-challenges-and-requirements}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001293} }
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