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The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has increased global energy prices, providing a financial windfall for Russia and reducing the discounts on Urals crude. While the short-term impact on the Russian state budget is limited, a prolonged conflict could make Russian hydrocarbons indispensable to Europe and Asia. Specifically, the crisis strengthens Russia's leverage with India and China, potentially accelerating the development of overland pipelines like Power of Siberia 2 and an expansion of the ESPO pipeline to bypass maritime chokepoints.

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  • The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has reversed the trend of increasing discounts on Russian oil. Between February 27 and March 6, the discount on Urals crude narrowed from $25 per barrel to $15 per barrel, with the price increasing by $30 per barrel, generating $8.5 billion in monthly revenue for Russia.
  • The shutdown of Qatari LNG exports has disrupted the global LNG market, which was previously expected to enter a glut due to new US plants. This disruption in March 2026 is described as exceeding the gas market disruption of summer 2022.
  • Global oil markets are facing a supply reduction of approximately 15 million barrels per day due to the crisis, but current capabilities can only compensate for 4–5 million barrels per day, leading analysts to raise 2026 price estimates by $20 per barrel.
  • The conflict increases the strategic importance of Russian oil to India and China, as both are the largest buyers of Gulf oil. This makes it more difficult for India to reduce its reliance on Russian oil despite US pressure.
  • The crisis may incentivize China to shift from maritime shipments to secure overland routes to avoid chokepoints, potentially leading to the realization of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline and an expansion of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline.
  • Russia's ability to act as a 'backup swing producer' for the US or Europe is limited by declining production caused by underinvestment and reduced drilling in the second half of 2025, meaning any production increase would take several months and significant investment.

Cite the original document

APA
Vakulenko, S. (2026). Russia, Oil, and the Iran War: Consequences. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/03/russia-oil-iran-war-consequences
Chicago
Vakulenko, Sergey. Russia, Oil, and the Iran War: Consequences. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2026. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/03/russia-oil-iran-war-consequences.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Vakulenko |first1=Sergey |title=Russia, Oil, and the Iran War: Consequences |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=24 March 2026 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/03/russia-oil-iran-war-consequences |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001158)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{vakulenko2026russia, author = {Vakulenko, Sergey}, title = {{Russia, Oil, and the Iran War: Consequences}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2026}, month = mar, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/03/russia-oil-iran-war-consequences}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001158} }

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