The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity

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The document examines the dual-use nature of biotechnology, highlighting its potential for medical, agricultural, and environmental benefits alongside risks of accidental pathogen release and deliberate weaponization. It identifies critical gaps in global governance, noting that the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Australia Group lack the binding verification, funding, and updated scope necessary to address modern threats like synthetic biology and the DIY biotech community.

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  • Biotechnology offers significant potential for global problem-solving, including the creation of vaccines and diagnostics for infectious diseases, genetically modified crops like 'golden rice' to combat malnutrition, and the use of bacterial enzymes to address plastic pollution.
  • Biosafety threats include both accidental laboratory leaks and unintended environmental consequences. Historical examples include the 1978 smallpox infection in Birmingham, UK, and a 2019 leak in China that infected nearly 3,000 people with Brucellosis. Additionally, gene drives pose risks due to their 'self-propagating nature' and potential to affect non-target species.
  • Biosecurity risks are amplified by synthetic biology and the 'do-it-yourself (DIY)' community, which may allow nefarious actors to synthesize pathogens from genomic information available online or exploit cyber vulnerabilities in labs. Examples of attempted illicit acquisition include the Aum Shinrikyo cult's efforts to obtain Ebola in 1995.
  • The Convention on Biological Diversity, through the Cartagena and Nagoya Protocols, is limited because it primarily governs the physical transfer of GMOs and benefit-sharing rather than digital DNA sequences or laboratory safety standards.
  • The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) lacks a verification and monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance, partly due to a lack of consensus among members; for instance, the US has argued that verification would risk proprietary corporate information.
  • The Australia Group provides a list of controlled compounds and dual-use equipment to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons, but it is an informal coalition rather than a legally binding agreement.
  • Current global governance is fragmented and fails to keep pace with technological advances, lacking mandatory global standards, accountability mechanisms, and sufficient funding.

Cite the original document

APA
Sharma, R. L. S. (2020). The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/11/the-blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-a-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity
Chicago
Sharma, Ronit Langer, Shruti. The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/11/the-blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-a-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Sharma |first1=Ronit Langer, Shruti |title=The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=20 November 2020 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/11/the-blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-a-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-001109)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{sharma2020blessing, author = {Sharma, Ronit Langer, Shruti}, title = {{The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2020}, month = nov, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/11/the-blessing-and-curse-of-biotechnology-a-primer-on-biosafety-and-biosecurity}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-001109} }

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