Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy
Summary
This research paper argues that Turkey's heavy reliance on energy imports, particularly from Russia, creates economic and security vulnerabilities that shape its international relations. It finds that while Turkey is diversifying its portfolio, it remains deeply dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and nuclear technology, which complicates its aspirations to be a reliable energy partner for Europe.
Key insights
- Turkey faces a significant energy dependence problem, importing almost all of the energy it consumes, with demand projected to rise until at least 2035.
- In 2021, hydrocarbons (coal, natural gas, and oil) accounted for 84 percent of Turkey's energy supply.
- Russia remains Turkey's primary supplier of natural gas, coal, and oil, despite diversification efforts; in 2022, Turkey imported 100 percent of its natural gas, 91 percent of its oil products, and 77 percent of its coal, with Russia as the prime partner in all three.
- Turkey discovered the Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea in August 2020, with reserves estimated at 710 billion cubic meters, which the government claims could cover one-third of Turkey's natural gas needs for 25 to 30 years.
- Turkey's ambition to become a regional natural gas hub involves exporting gas to Europe, but this is hindered by limited pipeline capacity (TANAP) and the political difficulty of selling Russian gas to EU members.
- The Akkuyu nuclear power plant, owned and operated by Russia's Rosatom, is expected to be fully operational by 2026 and provide 10 percent of Turkey's domestic electricity needs.
- Turkey's energy transition is slow; it only ratified the Paris Agreement at the end of 2021 and plans to increase greenhouse gas emissions until 2038 despite a net zero target for 2053.
- Turkey has engaged in 'origin swap' practices with Russian diesel, importing large quantities for domestic use while exporting its own production to the EU, which some observers view as sanctions evasion.
- Energy disputes with Iraq led Turkey to stop importing Iraqi oil in March 2023 following an International Chamber of Commerce ruling regarding the Kurdistan Regional Government.
- Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean over maritime boundaries and the Cyprus problem hinder the development of pipelines to connect Turkey to gas fields in Israel and Cyprus.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Siccardi, F. (2024). Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2024/02/understanding-the-energy-drivers-of-turkeys-foreign-policy
- Chicago
- Siccardi, Francesco. Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2024/02/understanding-the-energy-drivers-of-turkeys-foreign-policy.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Siccardi |first1=Francesco |title=Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=28 February 2024 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2024/02/understanding-the-energy-drivers-of-turkeys-foreign-policy |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000649)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{siccardi2024understanding, author = {Siccardi, Francesco}, title = {{Understanding the Energy Drivers of Turkey’s Foreign Policy}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2024}, month = feb, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/research/2024/02/understanding-the-energy-drivers-of-turkeys-foreign-policy}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000649} }
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