How China and Pakistan Negotiate
Summary
The paper examines the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and finds that, contrary to narratives of unidirectional Chinese imposition, the project's routes, energy priorities, and special economic zones have been heavily influenced by Pakistani domestic political interests and agency.
Key insights
- The geographic route of the CPEC was shaped by Pakistani partisan politics, specifically the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party's desire for electoral gains in its Punjab and Sindh heartlands, which aligned with China's preference for using existing road networks.
- The initial phase of the CPEC focused heavily on energy generation, particularly coal-fired power plants, because the Pakistani government prioritized solving the national energy crisis to secure the PML-N's 2018 reelection bid.
- The development of the port of Gwadar was a Pakistani-initiated proposal from the early 2000s that China initially viewed with skepticism due to its remote location and modest commercial prospects before eventually adapting to Pakistani demands.
- Following the 2018 elections, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government shifted CPEC priorities toward socioeconomic development and industrial cooperation, forcing Chinese actors to adopt a more accommodative strategy.
- The selection of the Rashakai special economic zone (SEZ) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was driven by the PTI's partisan political interests, despite feasibility studies ranking it lower than other sites and a strong Chinese preference for alternatives.
- The development of SEZs has been slow due to bureaucratic complexity and a lack of a 'one window operation', and there is little evidence that the promised high-skilled jobs for locals are materializing, with Chinese firms often importing their own labor.
- In Gwadar, China has implemented a different model via a Free Trade Zone where it receives 91 percent of the profits under a build-operate and transfer model, while also funding social sector projects to appease local populations and reduce security risks.
- The establishment of the CPEC Authority in October 2019 represents a move toward more centralized political control, which has been welcomed by China but criticized by some Pakistani politicians as insulating the process from provincial input.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Boni, K. A. F. (2021). How China and Pakistan Negotiate. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/05/how-china-and-pakistan-negotiate
- Chicago
- Boni, Katharine Adeney, Filippo. How China and Pakistan Negotiate. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/05/how-china-and-pakistan-negotiate.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Boni |first1=Katharine Adeney, Filippo |title=How China and Pakistan Negotiate |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=24 May 2021 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/05/how-china-and-pakistan-negotiate |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000631)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{boni2021how, author = {Boni, Katharine Adeney, Filippo}, title = {{How China and Pakistan Negotiate}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2021}, month = may, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/05/how-china-and-pakistan-negotiate}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000631} }
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