Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?

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The author contends that current nuclear postures in the United States and Russia, focused on escalation dominance, are abnormal and dangerously excessive. To mitigate the risk of global catastrophe, the paper proposes two initiatives: commissioning scientific studies on the climatic effects of nuclear war (specifically nuclear winter) and querying nuclear-armed states on their adherence to international humanitarian law. The author suggests that China could be a pivotal player in leading a move toward "accountable deterrents"—arsenals that are strategically and legally defensible and physically bounded to prevent global environmental collapse.

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  • The author argues that the central question for nuclear-armed states should shift from "How much is enough?" to "How much is too much?", focusing on what arsenal size and doctrine are too likely to cause "humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that would be strategically and legally indefensible?"
  • The paper proposes an initiative for nuclear-armed states to commission scientific experts to study the climatic consequences of nuclear war, specifically exploring how changes in "numbers, yields, and targets of nuclear weapons would significantly reduce the probability of nuclear winter."
  • A second proposed initiative would ask nuclear-armed states to clarify if and how they plan to "adhere to international humanitarian law" (IHL) or the "law of armed conflict" (LOAC) when deciding to detonate nuclear weapons.
  • The author asserts that the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia are "abnormal" in size and operational ambition, together possessing "92 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons."
  • The pursuit of "escalation dominance" by the United States and Russia is described as leading to "costly and destabilizing arms racing" and creating a drive toward escalation that is extremely difficult to contain once deterrence fails.
  • The author suggests that China could be a "pivotal player" in changing the global nuclear order by extending its traditional restraint into a new approach to arms control and disarmament with the U.S. and Russia.
  • The paper posits that "accountable deterrents" could be based on a heuristic of roughly 300 weapons with the lowest necessary yields, arguing that such low numbers have been sufficient for other nuclear-armed states to avoid major aggression.
  • The author argues that complete nuclear disarmament is currently "infeasible" and that focusing solely on it creates a "straw man" used by advocates of escalation dominance to divert attention from the dangers of the status quo.

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APA
Perkovich, G. (2020). Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/02/toward-accountable-nuclear-deterrents-how-much-is-too-much
Chicago
Perkovich, George. Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/02/toward-accountable-nuclear-deterrents-how-much-is-too-much.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Perkovich |first1=George |title=Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much? |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=11 February 2020 |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/02/toward-accountable-nuclear-deterrents-how-much-is-too-much |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document carnend-000489)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{perkovich2020toward, author = {Perkovich, George}, title = {{Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?}}, institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2020}, month = feb, url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/02/toward-accountable-nuclear-deterrents-how-much-is-too-much}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document carnend-000489} }

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