How to implement the proposals from the open letter on ISDS and COVID-19?
Summary
The document outlines six measures for governments to protect their right to regulate in the public interest during the COVID-19 pandemic without facing ISDS lawsuits. These include permanently restricting ISDS for COVID-19 measures by withholding or withdrawing consent, seeking a political moratorium on ongoing cases, refusing to pay ISDS awards using public funds, stopping the negotiation of new treaties with ISDS, terminating existing agreements, and conducting comprehensive reviews of investment treaties to assess their risks versus benefits.
Key insights
- Governments can restrict ISDS for COVID-19 measures through three primary legal routes: withholding consent in treaties that require case-by-case agreement (which applies to 98 of 2577 UNCTAD-mapped IIAs), withdrawing consent in treaties where it was automatic (applicable to 96% of IIAs in force), or entering into bilateral or multilateral suspension agreements as proposed by the IISD.
- While 397 open ISDS cases exist against 83 countries, governments lack the unilateral power to suspend ongoing proceedings, as this is decided by investors and arbitrators. The document cites Bolivia's failed attempts to suspend cases (Glencore v. Bolivia and Orlandini and Compania Minera Orlandini v. Bolivia) as evidence, suggesting instead that governments issue a collective political declaration for a moratorium.
- To prevent public funds from paying ISDS awards during the pandemic, states can modify national arbitration laws to make awards that challenge COVID-19 measures or undermine crisis response incompatible with 'public policy' grounds, or clarify that arbitration agreements are invalid if the state unilaterally withdrew consent due to the pandemic.
- Governments can terminate existing ISDS agreements via multilateral termination (e.g., 23 EU Member States), unilateral termination (e.g., South Africa, Indonesia, India), mutual consent under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, or joint agreements in free trade agreements. Unilateral termination is the easiest but may trigger 'survival clauses' allowing investors to sue for up to 20 years, whereas the other three methods can annul these clauses.
- Comprehensive reviews of investment treaties by governments such as South Africa and Ecuador have concluded that the risks of these agreements outweigh the benefits, leading to recommendations to roll back ISDS commitments.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Both ENDS (n.d.). How to implement the proposals from the open letter on ISDS and COVID-19? https://www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/inlineitem/ANNEX-COVID-ISDS-letter.pdf
- Chicago
- Both ENDS. How to implement the proposals from the open letter on ISDS and COVID-19? n.d. https://www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/inlineitem/ANNEX-COVID-ISDS-letter.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |author=Both ENDS |title=How to implement the proposals from the open letter on ISDS and COVID-19? |url=https://www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/inlineitem/ANNEX-COVID-ISDS-letter.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document bothends-000467)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{bothendsndhow, author = {{Both ENDS}}, title = {{How to implement the proposals from the open letter on ISDS and COVID-19?}}, institution = {Both ENDS}, url = {https://www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/inlineitem/ANNEX-COVID-ISDS-letter.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document bothends-000467} }
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