Perceptions populaires des cause et conséquences du conflit au Mali

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The document finds that by December 2013, Malians primarily identified foreign terrorists, corruption, and the desire for natural resources as the main causes of the conflict in the North.

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  • Between December 2012 and December 2013, public perception of the primary causes of the crisis shifted from internal issues—specifically the lack of patriotism of leaders and state weakness—to external and systemic factors, with foreign terrorists, corruption, and the desire for natural resources becoming the top three reasons for the conflict in the North.
  • Rebels and Islamist groups are perceived by the vast majority of Malians as the primary actors involved in drug trafficking, alongside transnational organized crime. In Kidal specifically, there is a significantly higher perception of involvement by public bodies, such as customs (58%), the Malian military (27%), and local elected officials (25%).
  • The conflict in the North led to internal population displacement affecting 6% of the surveyed population, with the highest rates in Tombouctou (35%), Kidal (33%), and Gao (21%).
  • Approximately 29% of Malians were personally affected or affected through a family member by the events in the North. Common impacts include the destruction or closure of businesses, job loss, and witnessing killings or injuries. Specific atrocities were most prevalent in certain regions: Sharia punishments were highest in Gao (18%), and torture was most prevalent in Kidal (8%).
  • There is a strong public consensus (86% to 95%) that civic education, justice, and a strong state are the primary options to resolve the conflict. Additionally, 65% of respondents believe that signing a new peace agreement could potentially be the basis for lasting peace in Mali.
  • The perceived necessity of using violence for a good cause in politics decreased from 28% in 2012 to 23% in 2013, a change attributed to the peaceful organization of presidential and legislative elections in 2013.

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APA
Coulibaly, M. (n.d.). Perceptions populaires des cause et conséquences du conflit au Mali. Afrobarometer. https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ab_r5_5_policypaperno10_fr.pdf
Chicago
Coulibaly, Massa. Perceptions populaires des cause et conséquences du conflit au Mali. Afrobarometer, n.d. https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ab_r5_5_policypaperno10_fr.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Coulibaly |first1=Massa |title=Perceptions populaires des cause et conséquences du conflit au Mali |publisher=Afrobarometer |url=https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ab_r5_5_policypaperno10_fr.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document afbarom-000027)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{coulibalyndperceptions, author = {Coulibaly, Massa}, title = {{Perceptions populaires des cause et conséquences du conflit au Mali}}, institution = {Afrobarometer}, url = {https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ab_r5_5_policypaperno10_fr.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document afbarom-000027} }

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