THREE YEARS OF PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN GHANA

Report an error

Summary

AI-generated

This summary is written by a language model reading the source document. It is not the publisher's words and is not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment

This report finds that while Ghana has improved transparency in its petroleum revenue management, accountability remains low due to inefficient spending, data discrepancies, and the arbitrary use of ministerial discretion to reduce savings in the Stabilization Fund.

Key insights

AI-generated

These insights are written by a language model reading the source document. They are not the publisher's words and are not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment
  • Ghana's potential earnings from oil were reduced by several factors, including the non-collection of capital gains tax on Jubilee field acquisitions, non-collection of corporate taxes, non-reporting of surface rental fees, and the redetermination of the Original Hydro Carbon in Place in the Jubilee Unit Operating Area.
  • The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) exhibits weak spending capacity, evidenced by approximately US$141.70 million in unspent cash over three years despite parliamentary approval of the intended programs.
  • There is evidence of inefficiency in the use of petroleum revenues, where limited funds were distributed too thinly across projects, resulting in cost and timeframe over-runs and undermining value for money.
  • The Minister of Finance used discretionary powers under the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) to arbitrarily cap the Stabilization Fund at US$250 million, diverting excess revenues toward debt repayment rather than savings.
  • Government reporting is inadequate because it fails to account for annual stocks and spill-over barrels in crude oil accounting or benchmark revenue determination, creating risks of under-declaration of produced oil.
  • Significant data discrepancies exist between government reports and those from accountability institutions like PIAC and GHEITI, suggesting these institutions lack the capacity for truly independent validation.
  • A case study on crude oil lifting revealed that data from the Bank of Ghana fell short of Ghana's entitlement by 868,826 barrels compared to GNPC and government data.
  • The Ghana National Gas Company (GNGC) was capitalized using the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), which is inconsistent with Act 815, as NOC capitalization should be funded from equity financing and investments.

Cite the original document

APA
Adam, M. A. (2014). THREE YEARS OF PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN GHANA. Africa Centre for Energy Policy. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ACEP-Report-PRMA-Final.pdf
Chicago
Adam, Mohammed Amin. THREE YEARS OF PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN GHANA. Africa Centre for Energy Policy, 2014. https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ACEP-Report-PRMA-Final.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Adam |first1=Mohammed Amin |title=THREE YEARS OF PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN GHANA |publisher=Africa Centre for Energy Policy |date=July 2014 |url=https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ACEP-Report-PRMA-Final.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document acep-000065)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{adam2014three, author = {Adam, Mohammed Amin}, title = {{THREE YEARS OF PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN GHANA}}, institution = {Africa Centre for Energy Policy}, year = {2014}, month = jul, url = {https://acep.africa/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ACEP-Report-PRMA-Final.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document acep-000065} }

Full text

Collected · Record updated