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The report finds that Erdenes Mongol has evolved into a complex, politicized conglomerate with limited transparency and low profitability, failing to pay regular dividends to the Mongolian treasury despite owning some of the country's largest mineral deposits.

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  • Erdenes Mongol has expanded from its original mandate of managing strategic mines into a complex conglomerate with interests in unconventional oil and gas, roads, hospitality, power generation, steel, and asset management.
  • The company's governance is heavily politicized, characterized by high turnover of senior management and board members that typically correlates with national elections; the average tenure of a CEO is 1.7 years.
  • Financial transparency is insufficient, as most subsidiaries do not publish financial information and the group does not comply with international accounting or state-owned enterprise disclosure standards.
  • Despite owning highly valuable assets, Erdenes Mongol and its subsidiaries have not paid regular dividends to the Mongolian treasury, unlike comparable regional state-owned mining companies in China, India, and Indonesia.
  • The company's asset valuation is heavily skewed toward the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine, which accounted for 82.5 percent of its valued assets (approximately MNT 7.7 trillion) as of the end of 2017.
  • Many subsidiaries are unprofitable or struggle with liquidity; for example, Shivee Ovoo and Baganuur sell coal to power plants at regulated prices below market value, leading to accumulated debts.
  • The group faces significant future financial risks due to high leverage and the potential for subsidiaries to become government budget liabilities if they cannot meet debt obligations.
  • The company's mandate remains unclear and lacks a strict legislative framework, leading to ad hoc decision-making regarding the establishment of new subsidiaries and joint ventures.

Cite the original document

APA
Bauer, A., & Namkhaijantsan, D. (2019). WILD GROWTH. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/wild-growth-an-assessment-of-erdenes-mongol-full-report.pdf
Chicago
Bauer, Andrew, and Dorjdari Namkhaijantsan. WILD GROWTH. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2019. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/wild-growth-an-assessment-of-erdenes-mongol-full-report.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Bauer |first1=Andrew |last2=Namkhaijantsan |first2=Dorjdari |title=WILD GROWTH |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=June 2019 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/wild-growth-an-assessment-of-erdenes-mongol-full-report.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000875)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{bauer2019wild, author = {Bauer, Andrew and Namkhaijantsan, Dorjdari}, title = {{WILD GROWTH}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2019}, month = jun, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/wild-growth-an-assessment-of-erdenes-mongol-full-report.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000875} }

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