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This report analyzes 52 resource-backed loans totaling $164 billion and finds that these opaque financial arrangements often contribute to serious debt distress in countries with poor resource governance.

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  • Between 2004 and 2018, 52 resource-backed loans (RBLs) totaling $164 billion were identified across 14 countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, with two-thirds of these loans going to countries with poor or failing scores on the Resource Governance Index.
  • RBLs are characterized by extreme opacity; in only one of the 52 surveyed cases was the key contract document public, and basic information like interest rates was identifiable in only 19 cases.
  • The lending landscape is dominated by two Chinese policy banks—the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank)—which provided 77 percent of the total RBL value in the studied regions.
  • RBLs are primarily used for capital spending, with over 90 percent of their value earmarked for infrastructure projects, although some funds have allegedly been diverted to military spending in South Sudan.
  • RBLs can offer cheaper financing than commercial Eurobonds in sub-Saharan Africa, though they remain more expensive than concessional loans from international financial institutions.
  • Certain RBL structures can mitigate volatility by linking repayment schedules to commodity prices, allowing for slower repayment when prices are low and faster repayment when prices are high.
  • Large RBLs have significantly undermined debt sustainability; ten of the 14 recipient countries experienced serious debt problems after the 2014 commodity price crash, with RBLs cited as an important contributor in all cases where sustainability problems emerged.
  • RBLs can exacerbate financial distress by acting as 'super-senior debt' that is repaid before other sovereign obligations, which complicates orderly default procedures and debt rescheduling.
  • Despite their risks, RBLs are often easier to renegotiate than sovereign bonds because they involve fewer creditors and the lenders often have interdependent business interests in the country.

Cite the original document

APA
Mihalyi, D., Adam, A., & Hwang, J. (2020). Resource-Backed Loans: Pitfalls and Potential. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/resource-backed-loans-pitfalls-and-potential.pdf
Chicago
Mihalyi, David, Aisha Adam, and Jyhjong Hwang. Resource-Backed Loans: Pitfalls and Potential. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2020. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/resource-backed-loans-pitfalls-and-potential.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Mihalyi |first1=David |last2=Adam |first2=Aisha |last3=Hwang |first3=Jyhjong |title=Resource-Backed Loans: Pitfalls and Potential |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=February 2020 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/resource-backed-loans-pitfalls-and-potential.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000767)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{mihalyi2020resourcebacked, author = {Mihalyi, David and Adam, Aisha and Hwang, Jyhjong}, title = {{Resource-Backed Loans: Pitfalls and Potential}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2020}, month = feb, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/resource-backed-loans-pitfalls-and-potential.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000767} }

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