Localizing Tanzania’s Gas Sector
Summary
The document argues that Tanzania's 'hard' approach to local content, characterized by mandatory targets without a quantitative baseline of local capacity, risks increasing project costs and encouraging non-compliance or 'fronting'.
Key insights
- Tanzania has adopted a "hard" approach to local content, utilizing legally binding requirements and minimum local content levels for labor and goods, which contrasts with the "soft" approaches seen in other emerging African producers like Mozambique, Kenya, and Liberia.
- The legally binding definition of a "local company" allows a joint venture that is 85 percent foreign-controlled to qualify as local, which the authors argue is a loophole that limits the benefits Tanzanians receive from local content provisions.
- The government has not yet conducted a comprehensive quantitative baseline study of the existing and potential capacity of Tanzania's workforce and companies, creating a risk that mandatory targets are unrealistic and could deter investment or lower government revenues.
- Tanzania's gas reserves (estimated at 57 trillion cubic feet, with development plans for 28 tcf) may be too small to justify investing in highly specialized technical skills or goods that are only useful for gas operations; the authors recommend focusing on transferable skills that benefit the wider economy.
- The current local content regulations lack transparency, as there are few explicit provisions for public access to information, and it is unclear whether local content plans and reports are designated as public records.
- There is significant ambiguity and a lack of coordination between government institutions, specifically between the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) and the National Economic Empowerment Council (NEEC), regarding the implementation and monitoring of the local content strategy.
- The requirement for companies to enter into joint ventures or business arrangements when goods are not available in Tanzania is described as unusually demanding and may be unsustainable if the local partner cannot find demand outside the gas sector.
- The risk of "fronting" (where shell companies are used to meet local content quotas) is increased by mandatory targets that are out of sync with actual local capacity and a definition of local companies based solely on equity ownership.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Scurfield, T., Woodroffe, N., & Olan’g, S. (2017). Localizing Tanzania’s Gas Sector. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/localizing-tanzania-gas-sector-determining-optimal-policies.pdf
- Chicago
- Scurfield, Thomas, Nicola Woodroffe, and Silas Olan’g. Localizing Tanzania’s Gas Sector. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2017. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/localizing-tanzania-gas-sector-determining-optimal-policies.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Scurfield |first1=Thomas |last2=Woodroffe |first2=Nicola |last3=Olan’g |first3=Silas |title=Localizing Tanzania’s Gas Sector |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=August 2017 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/localizing-tanzania-gas-sector-determining-optimal-policies.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000507)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{scurfield2017localizing, author = {Scurfield, Thomas and Woodroffe, Nicola and Olan’g, Silas}, title = {{Localizing Tanzania’s Gas Sector}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2017}, month = aug, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/localizing-tanzania-gas-sector-determining-optimal-policies.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000507} }
Full text
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