Le partage des revenus des ressources naturelles en Tunisie

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The report argues that Tunisia's current intergovernmental transfer system fails to adequately benefit resource-rich regions, which often suffer from high poverty and unemployment despite their extractive activities. It recommends a transparent, criteria-based sharing mechanism that balances regional convergence with the specific needs of producing areas.

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  • Tunisia's extractive sector has a relatively small impact on the national GDP, with the contribution of oil and gas activities decreasing from 6% in 2014 to approximately 2.7% in 2018.
  • Resource-rich governorates such as Tataouine, Gafsa, and Kébili experience high unemployment rates, which were twice the national average of 15.2% at the end of 2015, indicating that extractive activities have not significantly reduced local unemployment.
  • The 2018 Code of Local Authorities introduced the 'Fonds d’appui à la décentralisation, à la péréquation, à la régularisation et à la solidarité entre les collectivités locales', which can be funded by a portion of state revenues from natural resources per Article 136 of the Constitution.
  • Local authorities in Tunisia do not currently collect specific taxes or royalties from natural resource extraction; these revenues are centralized in the state budget.
  • The report identifies four possible approaches for revenue sharing: a direct criteria-based formula for all, a weighted criteria formula to favor disadvantaged regions, a mixed approach combining criteria with production-based derivation, and a reform of the TCL to better reflect activity location.
  • International benchmarking shows that Canada uses a system of provincial direct collection combined with federal equalization transfers, while Mongolia uses a mixed system with a General Local Development Fund (GLDF) and specific allocations for producing provinces.
  • The report recommends that any additional resource revenue transfers be linked to the funding of transferred competencies, such as health, education, and local economic development, to limit discretionary spending.

Cite the original document

APA
Aboukhaled, N. (2022). Le partage des revenus des ressources naturelles en Tunisie. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/le_partage_des_revenus_des_ressources_naturelles_en_tunisie_0.pdf
Chicago
Aboukhaled, Nadine. Le partage des revenus des ressources naturelles en Tunisie. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2022. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/le_partage_des_revenus_des_ressources_naturelles_en_tunisie_0.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Aboukhaled |first1=Nadine |title=Le partage des revenus des ressources naturelles en Tunisie |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=July 2022 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/le_partage_des_revenus_des_ressources_naturelles_en_tunisie_0.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000493)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{aboukhaled2022partage, author = {Aboukhaled, Nadine}, title = {{Le partage des revenus des ressources naturelles en Tunisie}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2022}, month = jul, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/le_partage_des_revenus_des_ressources_naturelles_en_tunisie_0.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000493} }

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