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The document examines Ghana's transition to more restrictive ring-fencing rules to prevent extractive companies from using 'sideways relief' to offset profits from productive fields against exploration costs in new projects. It highlights a dispute involving the Jubilee Field, where contractors allegedly offset costs for the TEN and MTA development areas against Jubilee profits, leading to delayed corporate income tax. In response, Ghana's 2015 Income Tax Act introduced explicit and more demanding ring-fencing definitions for both mining and petroleum operations to reduce ambiguity and expedite revenue collection amidst a budget deficit.

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  • Ghana experienced delays in corporate income tax collection from its first commercial oil discovery because contractors for the West Cape Three Points (WCTP) and Deep Water Tano (DWT) concessions allegedly offset exploration and development costs for the TEN and MTA Development Areas against profits from the Jubilee Field.
  • The Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) faced significant challenges in administering the extractive tax regime due to a lack of technical expertise, poor coordination with the Mineral and Petroleum Commissions, a lack of benchmark data for expenditure, and limited access to international tax information.
  • To resolve ambiguity in the Internal Revenue Act of 2012, the new Income Tax Act defines a 'separate mineral operation' as a mineral operation pertaining to each mine or one with a shared processing facility, though the term 'shared processing facility' remains undefined.
  • Ghana introduced a more restrictive petroleum ring-fence in the 2015 Income Tax Act, defining a 'separate petroleum operation' as authorized activities pertaining to a petroleum right, which allows for the independent taxation of multiple operations within a single right.
  • The decision to implement a demanding ring-fence in the petroleum sector was driven by the need to expedite corporate income tax collection to address a budget deficit caused by falling oil prices and poor public financial management.
  • The document concludes that while ring-fencing prevents tax base erosion and speeds up revenue, it creates a trade-off by potentially deterring further exploration and investment, which could reduce the total tax base over the long term.

Cite the original document

APA
Readhead, A. (2016). Getting a Good Deal: Ring-fencing in Ghana. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/getting-a-good-deal-ring-fencing-in-ghana.pdf
Chicago
Readhead, Alexandra. Getting a Good Deal: Ring-fencing in Ghana. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2016. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/getting-a-good-deal-ring-fencing-in-ghana.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Readhead |first1=Alexandra |title=Getting a Good Deal: Ring-fencing in Ghana |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=March 2016 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/getting-a-good-deal-ring-fencing-in-ghana.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000405)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{readhead2016getting, author = {Readhead, Alexandra}, title = {{Getting a Good Deal: Ring-fencing in Ghana}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2016}, month = mar, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/getting-a-good-deal-ring-fencing-in-ghana.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000405} }

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