How Did Fiscal Rules Hold Up in the Commodity Price Crash?

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The report examines fiscal rules across 79 countries in the Resource Governance Index, finding that 34 have such rules. During the 2015-2016 commodity price crash, only six countries fully complied with their rules. The analysis highlights that many rules are pro-cyclical or poorly designed, and that independent oversight is often lacking or ineffective, leading to frequent rule modifications or suspensions.

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  • Of the 79 countries assessed in the Resource Governance Index, 34 (43 percent) have fiscal rules in place, a rate similar to the global average of 48 percent of UN member countries.
  • Budget balance rules are the most common type of fiscal rule among the sampled countries, followed by debt rules, while expenditure and revenue rules are the least common.
  • Compliance with fiscal rules was very low during the 2015-2016 commodity price crash; only six countries—Botswana, Colombia, Indonesia, Liberia, Malaysia, and Norway—fully adhered to their rules in both years.
  • In 25 of the 34 cases reviewed, fiscal rules were suspended, modified, or disregarded during the period of economic shock.
  • Only one country, Peru, utilized a well-defined escape clause to manage the economic shock, whereas other countries typically modified or broke their rules.
  • There is a strong positive correlation between a country's overall Resource Governance Index (RGI) score and the presence of fiscal rules.
  • Budget balance rules are often pro-cyclical in resource-rich countries because they allow spending to increase with revenues and force cuts when revenues decline, transmitting commodity volatility into fiscal policy.
  • Only 11 of the 34 examined countries have an external oversight body—such as a supreme audit institution, fiscal council, or parliamentary budget office—to monitor compliance.
  • Countries with national oversight bodies are more likely to follow their fiscal rules (33 percent of cases) compared to those with no formal domestic oversight (14 percent of cases).
  • Supranational fiscal rules, such as those in the CEMAC and WAEMU regions, showed very low compliance rates, with no member country following budget balance rules in 2016.

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APA
Mihalyi, D., & Fernández, L. (2018). How Did Fiscal Rules Hold Up in the Commodity Price Crash? Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fiscal-rules-commodity-crash.pdf
Chicago
Mihalyi, David, and Liliana Fernández. How Did Fiscal Rules Hold Up in the Commodity Price Crash? Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2018. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fiscal-rules-commodity-crash.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Mihalyi |first1=David |last2=Fernández |first2=Liliana |title=How Did Fiscal Rules Hold Up in the Commodity Price Crash? |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=June 2018 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fiscal-rules-commodity-crash.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000379)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{mihalyi2018how, author = {Mihalyi, David and Fernández, Liliana}, title = {{How Did Fiscal Rules Hold Up in the Commodity Price Crash?}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2018}, month = jun, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fiscal-rules-commodity-crash.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000379} }

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