The Fiscal Regime for Uganda’s Mining Sector: A Need for Reform?

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The analysis finds that Uganda's current mining fiscal regime has no critical weaknesses and is not in urgent need of revision, though it imposes a relatively high tax burden on small, high-cost mines. The author evaluates four reform options—variable rate royalties, accelerated capital depreciation, variable income tax, and a resource rent tax—concluding that while reforms could improve progressivity and attract a wider range of investors, they involve trade-offs regarding revenue reliability and tax administration complexity.

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  • Uganda's current mining fiscal regime is not in urgent need of revision and lacks critical weaknesses, though it may be too ambitious for small, high-cost mines compared to countries with more established sectors.
  • The current regime captures a relatively large share of company profits, with the government take exceeding the 40 to 60 percent range estimated by the IMF as reasonably achievable for mining countries.
  • Uganda's fiscal regime provides reasonable revenue reliability during the early years of a project when profits are low, outperforming regimes in Ghana and South Africa in this specific metric.
  • The current regime is largely unresponsive to mine costs and becomes slightly regressive for high-cost mines, as import duties and royalties consume a larger share of cash flow without sufficient compensation from reduced corporate income tax.
  • There are significant concerns regarding the Uganda Revenue Authority's capacity to collect profit taxes, suggesting that a heavy reliance on profit-based taxes may increase tax avoidance risks.
  • Among the evaluated reforms, a variable income tax (Regime D) and a variable rate royalty (Regime B) offer the best balance between revenue reliability and progressivity.
  • Introducing a resource rent tax combined with a lower corporate income tax (Regime E) provides the highest progressivity but significantly weakens revenue reliability and increases tax avoidance risks.
  • Accelerated capital depreciation (Regime C) would lower investor risk, particularly for smaller mines with shorter production lives, without increasing tax avoidance risks.

Cite the original document

APA
Scurfield, T. (2018). The Fiscal Regime for Uganda’s Mining Sector: A Need for Reform? Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fiscal-regime-for-uganda-mining-sector.pdf
Chicago
Scurfield, Thomas. The Fiscal Regime for Uganda’s Mining Sector: A Need for Reform? Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2018. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fiscal-regime-for-uganda-mining-sector.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Scurfield |first1=Thomas |title=The Fiscal Regime for Uganda’s Mining Sector: A Need for Reform? |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=December 2018 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fiscal-regime-for-uganda-mining-sector.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000378)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{scurfield2018fiscal, author = {Scurfield, Thomas}, title = {{The Fiscal Regime for Uganda’s Mining Sector: A Need for Reform?}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2018}, month = dec, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/fiscal-regime-for-uganda-mining-sector.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000378} }

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