Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar
Summary
The document examines the transition toward a federal Union in Myanmar and how the division of natural resource governance—including licensing, revenue collection, and environmental monitoring—can be structured. It contrasts different models of deconcentration, decentralization, and federalism, drawing on international examples from the Asia-Pacific region. The authors argue that while shifting power to subnational institutions can address ethnic grievances and improve local ownership, it requires clear legal definitions, capacity building, and the maintenance of national minimum standards to avoid corruption and a 'race to the bottom'.
Key insights
- Natural resource federalism in Myanmar is driven by widespread demands for subnational control, as stakeholders in resource-producing areas argue they have faced the social and environmental costs of extraction with few benefits, often linked to historical grievances between ethnic areas and the central government.
- The authors define a spectrum of options for shifting power from national to subnational levels: deconcentration (national officers stationed locally), decentralization/devolution (transfer of decision-making and accountability), and federalism (constitutional division of sovereignty).
- International trends suggest that a mixed model is common, where the national government sets regulations and standards while subnational governments handle implementation and monitoring, particularly for environmental and occupational safety and health (OSH) issues.
- Certain high-capacity functions, such as setting tax and royalty rates, negotiating large-scale offshore contracts, and collecting major revenue streams, are typically retained by national governments due to their technical complexity.
- To avoid a 'race to the bottom' regarding social and environmental standards, Myanmar should establish clear national minimum standards while allowing subnational governments to implement them or add tailored local regulations.
- Decentralizing governance without adequate subnational capacity increases risks of corruption and mismanagement; for example, the decentralization of licensing in Indonesia was linked to increased governance challenges and reduced investor interest.
- Effective coordination between government levels is essential to prevent overlapping permits and blurred accountability, particularly when licensing for artisanal and small-scale production is delegated to states and regions while large operations remain under Union control.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Bauer, A., Kirk, N., & Sahla, S. (2018). Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/federalism-considerations-for-myanmar-summary.pdf
- Chicago
- Bauer, Andrew, Natalie Kirk, and Sebastian Sahla. Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2018. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/federalism-considerations-for-myanmar-summary.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Bauer |first1=Andrew |last2=Kirk |first2=Natalie |last3=Sahla |first3=Sebastian |title=Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=January 2018 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/federalism-considerations-for-myanmar-summary.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000371)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{bauer2018natural, author = {Bauer, Andrew and Kirk, Natalie and Sahla, Sebastian}, title = {{Natural Resource Federalism: Considerations for Myanmar}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2018}, month = jan, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/federalism-considerations-for-myanmar-summary.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000371} }
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