Equitable Sharing of Mining Profits: The Best Deal for Tanzania?
Summary
Tanzania has adopted an innovative 'equitable sharing' approach to mining taxation, most notably a 50-50 split with Barrick Gold, where government and companies share 'economic benefits'. However, the author argues that this mechanism, specifically the imposition of a ceiling on the government's share, may leave the country shortchanged by reducing overall government take, making revenues more volatile, and increasing exposure to tax avoidance. Modeling suggests that the underlying legislative regime often provides a higher government share than the 50-50 split. The author recommends that Tanzania avoid this sharing mechanism in new deals, instead focusing on improving the underlying regime's flexibility—such as through variable royalties—and increasing transparency by disclosing existing contracts.
Key insights
- Tanzania's 'equitable sharing' mechanism, which includes a ceiling on the government's share of economic benefits, can result in lower government take than the country's underlying legislative fiscal regime.
- The ceiling on the government share links all revenues to mine profitability, which makes government income less reliable and can lead to years where no revenue is received from producing mines with low profits.
- The sharing mechanism increases the risk of tax avoidance because all government revenues, including those typically not based on profit like royalties, become dependent on the government's ability to assess profit.
- Negotiating benefit-sharing splits on a project-by-project basis without legislative guardrails increases the risks of corruption, costly mistakes, and unfavorable terms due to uneven negotiating capacity.
- Unlike Tanzania's approach, the regimes in Ecuador and the Philippines set a floor on the government share but no ceiling, meaning the governments do not have to compensate companies if they receive more than 50 percent of profits.
- The author suggests that Tanzania should abandon the sharing mechanism for new deals and instead improve the underlying regime by introducing royalty rates that vary with prices to increase flexibility.
- There is a significant lack of transparency regarding mining deals; while a 50-50 framework for Barrick is known, other deals remain unpublished despite legal requirements for disclosure.
Cite the original document
- APA
- SCURFIELD, T. (2023). Equitable Sharing of Mining Profits: The Best Deal for Tanzania? Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/equitable-sharing-mining-profits-best-deal-tanzania.pdf
- Chicago
- SCURFIELD, THOMAS. Equitable Sharing of Mining Profits: The Best Deal for Tanzania? Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2023. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/equitable-sharing-mining-profits-best-deal-tanzania.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=SCURFIELD |first1=THOMAS |title=Equitable Sharing of Mining Profits: The Best Deal for Tanzania? |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=September 2023 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/equitable-sharing-mining-profits-best-deal-tanzania.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000356)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{scurfield2023equitable, author = {SCURFIELD, THOMAS}, title = {{Equitable Sharing of Mining Profits: The Best Deal for Tanzania?}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2023}, month = sep, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/equitable-sharing-mining-profits-best-deal-tanzania.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000356} }
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