¿Atados de manos? Cómo los términos contractuales de la industria petrolera pueden limitar la flexibilidad de la política climática de los Gobiernos
Summary
The report analyzes 34 oil contracts from 11 countries signed since 2016, finding that traditional contractual language continues to hinder governments' ability to adapt to climate change. Most contracts include stabilization clauses that may protect companies from new environmental regulations or carbon taxes, and arbitration clauses that discourage the implementation of climate norms due to high legal costs. Additionally, force majeure clauses typically treat extreme weather as a justification for non-performance without requiring companies to integrate climate resilience into their operations. The author recommends that governments avoid stabilization clauses, limit international arbitration, and mandate climate risk integration in project design.
Key insights
- An analysis of 34 public oil contracts from 11 countries signed since the 2015 Paris Agreement shows that contractual language does not yet reflect a shift toward addressing climate risks or providing governments with the flexibility needed for climate policy.
- All analyzed contracts contain stabilization clauses, and more than half do not explicitly exclude environmental legislation, meaning they could restrict the application of new climate regulations. Specifically, 27 of 34 were 'economic equilibrium' clauses, which may shift the financial burden of new climate rules onto the government.
- Stabilization clauses may specifically hinder the use of carbon taxes; several contracts that excluded environmental legislation still protected companies from unspecified taxes or changes in tax laws.
- International arbitration clauses are present in 33 of 34 contracts (with 27 specifying international arbitration), which can create a 'chilling effect' on governments considering new climate regulations due to the high cost of defending claims.
- Force majeure clauses in 33 of 34 contracts include extreme weather events as grounds for non-performance, but they generally fail to require that companies prepare for climate-related risks or integrate resilience into project design.
- Some force majeure clauses are broad enough to include government regulation or action as a basis for claiming force majeure, potentially assigning the resulting costs to the government.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Woodroffe, N. (2021). ¿Atados de manos? Cómo los términos contractuales de la industria petrolera pueden limitar la flexibilidad de la política climática de los Gobiernos. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/atados_de_manos.pdf
- Chicago
- Woodroffe, Nicola. ¿Atados de manos? Cómo los términos contractuales de la industria petrolera pueden limitar la flexibilidad de la política climática de los Gobiernos. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2021. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/atados_de_manos.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Woodroffe |first1=Nicola |title=¿Atados de manos? Cómo los términos contractuales de la industria petrolera pueden limitar la flexibilidad de la política climática de los Gobiernos |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=September 2021 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/atados_de_manos.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000270)}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{woodroffe2021atados, author = {Woodroffe, Nicola}, title = {{¿Atados de manos? Cómo los términos contractuales de la industria petrolera pueden limitar la flexibilidad de la política climática de los Gobiernos}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2021}, month = sep, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/atados_de_manos.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000270} }
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