Summary

AI-generated

This summary is written by a language model reading the source document. It is not the publisher's words and is not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment

The report assesses Tunisia's upstream petroleum fiscal regime, finding that its terms are generally not competitive given the country's small geological potential. It compares Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) and Joint Venture (JV) agreements, noting that while JVs are progressive, they often result in a high government take that may deter investors. The authors recommend harmonizing PSC terms, increasing cost recovery ceilings, and adopting R-factor based profit-oil splits to enhance international competitiveness.

Key insights

AI-generated

These insights are written by a language model reading the source document. They are not the publisher's words and are not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment
  • Tunisia's proven oil and gas reserves are very small compared to regional neighbors; proven oil reserves are 0.42 billion barrels and gas reserves are 0.06 trillion cubic meters, which is approximately 1 percent of the reserves found in Libya and Algeria respectively.
  • Investment in oil and gas exploration has declined significantly, with total spending dropping from $1,498 million in 2007 to $583 million in 2017, and the number of exploration wells drilled falling from 20 in 2007 to only two in 2017.
  • The Tunisian government utilizes two primary contractual arrangements: a concession-based system, often involving joint ventures (JVs) with the state-owned company ETAP, and production sharing contracts (PSCs). While JVs currently govern most production, investors are increasingly favoring PSCs for new research permits.
  • Quantitative benchmarking reveals that Tunisia's fiscal terms are not sufficiently competitive for its geological profile. The JV regime and the Sud Remada PSC result in an Average Effective Tax Rate (AETR) that is higher than most benchmarked countries, except for Egypt and Algeria, which possess much larger reserves.
  • The Sfax Offshore PSC is more competitive for investors than the Sud Remada PSC due to a higher cost oil ceiling and a more generous profit-oil split, though it is less progressive because it uses production levels rather than the R-factor to determine profit sharing.
  • Political and institutional instability has deterred investment, including regulatory ambiguity and the disruptive role of the parliament. For example, the parliament's failure to approve a 2013 acquisition of the Didon oil field led the company Enquest to leave the country.
  • The report recommends that the government increase the cost recovery ceiling for PSCs to allow investors to recoup costs faster and adopt a standardized R-factor based profit-oil split with no more than three thresholds to improve progressivity.
  • To improve competitiveness, the authors suggest limiting ETAP's equity stakes in new, riskier ventures, as high state participation significantly increases the government take without improving the post-tax internal rate of return for investors.

Cite the original document

APA
Nakhle, C., & Lassourd, T. (2019). Assessing Tunisia’s Upstream Petroleum Fiscal Regime. Natural Resource Governance Institute. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/assessing-tunisia-upstream-petroleum-fiscal-regime.pdf
Chicago
Nakhle, Carole, and Thomas Lassourd. Assessing Tunisia’s Upstream Petroleum Fiscal Regime. Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2019. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/assessing-tunisia-upstream-petroleum-fiscal-regime.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Nakhle |first1=Carole |last2=Lassourd |first2=Thomas |title=Assessing Tunisia’s Upstream Petroleum Fiscal Regime |publisher=Natural Resource Governance Institute |date=September 2019 |url=https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/assessing-tunisia-upstream-petroleum-fiscal-regime.pdf |access-date=5 November 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory (document NRGI-000269)}}
BibTeX
@techreport{nakhle2019assessing, author = {Nakhle, Carole and Lassourd, Thomas}, title = {{Assessing Tunisia’s Upstream Petroleum Fiscal Regime}}, institution = {Natural Resource Governance Institute}, year = {2019}, month = sep, url = {https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/assessing-tunisia-upstream-petroleum-fiscal-regime.pdf}, urldate = {2026-11-05}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory, document NRGI-000269} }

Full text

Collected · Record updated