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The report details how right-wing extremists in Germany employ a multi-platform strategy, combining mainstream sites like Facebook and X with alternative, decentralized platforms to avoid regulation and reach wider audiences. It highlights the use of 'fear speech' and 'everyday' topics to attract new sympathizers, the diversification of financing through cryptocurrencies and digital memberships, and the challenges of monitoring visual content on TikTok. The document also discusses the impact of the European Digital Services Act (DSA) and the necessity of a holistic approach involving research, regulation, and deradicalization.

The report analyzes the link between misogyny and violent extremist ideologies, arguing that OGBV serves as an ideological gateway to radicalization. It evaluates the failures of current platform community guidelines and algorithmic systems in addressing gendered violence and proposes a 'Safety and Privacy by Design' approach, improved API access for researchers, and standardized transparency reporting to combat these systemic risks.

The report examines online gender-based violence (OGBV) as part of a continuum of violence that links misogyny to various extremist ideologies, including far-right and Islamist extremism. It argues that platforms often exacerbate these risks through engagement-based algorithmic ranking and inadequate content moderation. To counter this, the author recommends that platforms provide vetted researchers with API access, implement gender-disaggregated transparency reporting, adopt victim-survivor-centred 'Safety by Design' principles, and enhance cross-platform cooperation to track perpetrators and coordinated harassment campaigns.

The report examines how 'decentralized', 'generative', and 'immersive' technologies are being exploited by malicious actors to spread hate and disinformation. It highlights the role of the Fediverse and Web3 platforms like Odysee in creating extremist echo chambers, the capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate persuasive misinformation and toxic content, and the potential for Extended Reality (XR) to enable severe emotional manipulation and virtual crimes. The authors argue for updated regulatory frameworks, including the EU AI Act and Digital Services Act, and emphasize the need for international coordination, safety-by-design, and new taxonomies for virtual harms.

The report examines Odysee, a video-hosting platform built on the LBRY protocol, as a case study for how blockchain technology enables the monetisation of far-right and conspiracy-related content. It identifies specific 'incentivised' affordances—such as LBRY Credits (LBC), rewards for activity, and tipping—that attract actors who have been demonetised on mainstream platforms. Through qualitative and financial analysis, the study finds that while the platform is not exclusively far-right, it serves as a 'safe haven' where established extreme-right figures can maintain their reach and generate income, though earnings are highly volatile due to the fluctuating price of LBC. The report argues that Odysee's claim of being 'censorship-resistant' is a fallacy, as the operators use geoblocking and delisting to manage content, and suggests that regulatory frameworks like the EU Digital Services Act should account for the specific risks of 'incentivised' business models and gamification.

The document identifies technological, ethical, legal, and fragmentation barriers that inhibit public interest research on smaller and medium-sized platforms. It argues that current regulatory frameworks, such as the EU's Digital Services Act, primarily target very large platforms, leaving a gap in oversight for smaller platforms that may still pose significant risks. The author provides recommendations for platforms to standardize data access, for policy-makers to introduce legal 'safe harbours' for researchers, and for the research community to collaborate on tools and ethical frameworks.

The report identifies significant obstacles to conducting public interest research on platforms like Telegram, Discord, and Odysee, noting that technological choices, unclear Terms of Service (TOS), and the designation of large groups as 'private' inhibit the systematic monitoring of extremist activity. Through case studies, the authors found that German-language far-right groups on Telegram, English-language religious extremists on Discord, and French-language neo-fascists on Odysee use these platforms to spread hate speech, anti-democratic ideologies, and calls for violence. The report argues that current regulatory frameworks, such as the EU's Digital Services Act, often rely on user-base thresholds that exclude these medium- and small-sized platforms, leaving a gap in oversight and research access.

The report provides a cross-platform analysis of harmful online activity in the UK, identifying a complex ecosystem where disinformation, conspiracy theories, and extremism interlink. Using a dataset of 768 UK-relevant accounts, the study finds that while explicit hate speech is a small proportion of total messaging, extremist actors maintain significant reach on platforms like Facebook and YouTube. The research highlights a 'hybridised' threat landscape where anti-vaccine and anti-government narratives often blend into overt white supremacy, and notes a growing migration toward 'alt-tech' platforms such as Bitchute and Odysee.

The report examines the use of PeerTube, a decentralized video platform, by far-right and conspiracy movements in Germany. It finds that while these actors occupy a small fraction of the Fediverse, they exploit its decentralized structure to avoid the moderation and legal requirements of centralized platforms. Through network analysis and case studies, the report demonstrates that PeerTube often serves as a back-up for 'deplatforming' and that success on the platform is heavily dependent on pre-existing audience popularity. The authors argue that state regulation is limited by the software's nature and suggest community-led moderation and isolation of extremist instances as more effective responses.

The report identifies a growing online mis- and disinformation ecosystem in Ireland, where far-right actors have transitioned from pandemic-related conspiracy theories to targeting immigrants and the LGBTQ+ community. Based on an analysis of over 13 million posts, the study finds that social media platforms are failing to enforce community guidelines, allowing harmful content to proliferate. Twitter (X) is the most active platform, while Telegram serves as a key hub for organization. The research highlights that online disinformation fuels offline hostility and violence, including vigilante-style attacks and protests. It recommends stronger platform regulation, algorithmic transparency, and increased data access for researchers.

The report analyzes 12 social media platforms and various fundraising mechanisms used by actors in the Irish mis- and disinformation ecosystem. It finds that Twitter (X) is the most popular platform for these activities, while Telegram has seen exponential growth as a hub for original content and Russian state-backed media. Mainstream platforms like Facebook and Instagram show a shift in focus from COVID-19 health misinformation toward anti-immigration narratives. Alternative platforms such as Gab, Gettr, BitChute, and Rumble are used to host more explicit hate speech, including Holocaust denial and neo-Nazism, often serving as storage for content that would be banned on mainstream sites. Additionally, the report identifies 41 entities using 27 different donation platforms, including Stripe and PayPal, often in violation of the platforms' terms of service regarding hate speech and disinformation.

The report identifies health as the most prominent topic of mis- and disinformation in Ireland, followed by Irish politics and immigration. It highlights the role of alternative media outlets like Gript and TheLiberal.ie in amplifying false narratives, and documents the use of conspiratorial tropes—such as the 'Great Replacement' and 'plantation' narratives—to fuel anti-immigrant sentiment and target political figures. The analysis also covers the spread of COVID-19 misinformation, anti-LGBTQ+ campaigns, climate change denial, and 5G conspiracy theories, noting a significant overlap between these themes and a tendency for narratives to be imported from international far-right movements.

The report identifies a global convergence of far-right groups, conspiracy theorists, and 'parents' rights' movements targeting drag events to denigrate the LGBTQ+ community. While the US is the primary driver of narratives and the only country in the set to pass anti-drag legislation, similar tactics like doxxing and harassment are appearing globally. The report highlights the use of 'save the children' and 'groomer' narratives to justify extremism and warns that these fringe tropes are becoming mainstreamed in political discourse.

The report analyzes online gendered abuse in the US during 2022, focusing on events like the Depp v. Heard trial and the reversal of Roe v. Wade. It finds that these events acted as catalysts for misogynistic content, particularly targeting women in politics and those with intersecting identities. The study highlights the role of influencers like Andrew Tate and Nick Fuentes in spreading hate and criticizes social media platforms for inconsistent enforcement of their hate speech policies, especially in comment sections and regarding non-textual content.

The report examines how extremist radicalization in the US is shifting toward a 'post-organizational' model, where Generation Z is increasingly influenced by decentralized online networks rather than formal groups. It highlights the 'hybridization' of ideologies, where boundaries between different extremist movements blur, and identifies key threats from white supremacy, accelerationism, anti-government movements, Salafi-jihadism, the 'manosphere', and violent conspiracy theories. The authors emphasize the critical role of social media and gaming platforms in facilitating this process and call for updated prevention strategies that involve young people in their design.

The report provides a comparative analysis of far-right and radical right actors' strategies and linkages on established platforms versus alternative platforms like Telegram. It synthesizes methodological groundwork and empirical research to better understand the behavior of these actors and explores various data collection options for monitoring alternative platforms.

The document provides a summary of the 2021 expert conference "In the blind spot – How right-wing extremists use alternative online platforms for radicalisation," which was part of a project funded by the German Federal Ministry of Justice. The event brought together approximately 50 participants and livestream guests to discuss research, regulation, and law enforcement perspectives on digital right-wing extremism. Key discussion areas included the role of gaming communities, anti-feminist subcultures, cross-platform research challenges, and regulatory approaches to alternative platforms.

The report outlines the historical evolution of right-wing extremist internet use in Germany and the conceptual framework used for the "Countering Radicalisation in Right-Wing Extremist Online Subcultures" project. It highlights expert findings on the strategic use of mainstream and alternative platforms, the role of gaming and messenger services like Telegram, and the convergence of right-wing extremists with conspiracy theorists and anti-vaxxers.

The study analyzes the online behavior of right-wing extremists who use established platforms like Facebook and YouTube to link users to alternative platforms. It finds that these actors use 'softer' content and dog-whistling on mainstream sites to avoid deplatforming while moving more direct extremist communication to alternative spaces. While no single alternative platform dominates except for Telegram, the use of audiovisual platforms and 'fleeting content' like livestreams creates significant challenges for moderation and research due to a lack of traceability.

The report analyzes over 650,000 messages from 238 Telegram channels to understand the digital infrastructure of the far-right in Germany. It finds that while extremists use alternative platforms, they still maintain a significant presence on established sites by posting 'softer' content to avoid deletion, using Telegram as a hub for more radical material.