Innovative Incentive-Based Tools in Reform of Highly Migratory Fisheries at Project Development and Regional Scales

The report examines the transition from command-and-control regulatory frameworks to incentive-compatible management (ICM) in highly migratory fisheries, focusing on tuna, billfish, and sharks. It analyzes the use of rights-based management (RBM)—such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and vessel day schemes—and market-based tools like Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certifications and Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs). Through case studies in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, the document argues that secure access rights and market incentives can rationalize fleets, reduce overfishing, and increase resource rents. It emphasizes a 'gradual' approach to implementation, the importance of stakeholder participation, and the need for enabling conditions such as robust monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) to ensure the success of these interventions.

• Command-and-control regulatory frameworks in common pool fisheries often lead to a 'race to fish,' which results in overfishing and the dissipation of resource rents.
• The U.S. implemented an individual bycatch quota (IBQ) for bluefin tuna (BFT) in the Gulf of Mexico to reduce dead discards, which decreased by 75% according to some metrics.
• The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) implemented the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS), which shifted access fees from less than 6% to 14% of landed value, significantly increasing economic returns for coastal states.
• Australia's ITQ program for Southern bluefin tuna (SBFT) since 1984 led to a reduction in fleet capacity, with two-thirds of fishers leaving the fishery within the first two years, and increased the fishery's value from $14.3 million AUD in 1982-83 to $86.3 million AUD in 1994-95.
• The Tokelau Arrangement aims to manage South Pacific albacore (ALB) through zone-based management and interim EEZ limits to prevent the stock from breaching the limit reference point (LRP) of 20 percent SBF=0.
• Market-based incentives, such as MSC certifications, can provide price premiums, but the costs of fishery improvements are often incurred before any premium emerges.
• The 'first best' RBM strategy—strong individual rights to both resource and management—is often unattainable or undesirable due to concerns over fairness, equity, and the development aspirations of small island developing states (SIDS).
• Successful ICM implementation requires 'enabling conditions,' including robust monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS), and the use of cost recovery to fund these systems.

APA

Gentner, B. (2018). Innovative Incentive-Based Tools in Reform of Highly Migratory Fisheries at Project Development and Regional Scales. WWF International. https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/589/71wnbcln4n_08818_WWF_WB_Innovations_Local_Reg_Final_pxp.pdf

Chicago

Gentner, Brad. Innovative Incentive-Based Tools in Reform of Highly Migratory Fisheries at Project Development and Regional Scales. WWF International, 2018. https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/589/71wnbcln4n_08818_WWF_WB_Innovations_Local_Reg_Final_pxp.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Gentner |first1=Brad |title=Innovative Incentive-Based Tools in Reform of Highly Migratory Fisheries at Project Development and Regional Scales |publisher=WWF International |date=December 2018 |url=https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/589/71wnbcln4n_08818_WWF_WB_Innovations_Local_Reg_Final_pxp.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{gentner2018innovative, author = {Gentner, Brad}, title = {{Innovative Incentive-Based Tools in Reform of Highly Migratory Fisheries at Project Development and Regional Scales}}, institution = {WWF International}, year = {2018}, month = dec, url = {https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/589/71wnbcln4n_08818_WWF_WB_Innovations_Local_Reg_Final_pxp.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }