Enrolling the Local: Community-Based Anti-Corruption Efforts and Institutional Capture

The document examines the role of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) in combating corruption. While these efforts can reduce local-level bribery and increase transparency, they often fail to address 'institutional capture'—where elite interests manipulate state policies for private gain. Using a case study of rosewood logging in Madagascar's Makira Natural Park, the authors demonstrate that high-value resources can drive national-level corruption that overrides local conservation efforts. The briefing recommends a multi-level approach that integrates local social accountability with national-level democratic reforms and political economy analysis.

• Community-based anti-corruption efforts are designed to bypass corrupt state actors, empower affected citizens, and build local legitimacy. These initiatives often utilize tools such as local monitoring, citizen charters, participatory budgeting, and integrity pacts to increase social accountability.
• Institutional capture occurs when elite interests—including politicians and commercial actors—subvert democratic processes to ensure government policies serve private gain rather than the public interest, often through mechanisms like vote buying, patronage, or violence.
• In Makira Natural Park, Madagascar, community-based conservation successfully reduced local-level corruption, such as rangers soliciting bribes for illicit activities, partly due to the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) acting as an intermediary and providing per diems to government officials.
• Despite local successes, Makira Natural Park was severely impacted by illegal rosewood logging driven by global demand. High economic incentives led some community members to join the illicit trade, while elite exporters leveraged profits to acquire national political power, including seats in parliament and ministry positions.
• The document concludes that community-based efforts are effective when local resources are of little interest to national actors, but they are likely to fail when resources are highly valued for strategic or economic reasons. In such cases, a 'multi-level approach' is required to disrupt national-level institutional capture while maintaining local empowerment.

APA

Klein, B., Zhu, A., Pardo-Herrera, C., & Mullard, S. (2021). Enrolling the Local: Community-Based Anti-Corruption Efforts and Institutional Capture. WWF International. https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/133/42u8x4v659_Topic_Brief_Enrolling_the_Local_Community_Based_Anti_Corruption_Eff_xN18AoJ.pdf

Chicago

Klein, Brian, Annah Zhu, Camilo Pardo-Herrera, and Saul Mullard. Enrolling the Local: Community-Based Anti-Corruption Efforts and Institutional Capture. WWF International, 2021. https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/133/42u8x4v659_Topic_Brief_Enrolling_the_Local_Community_Based_Anti_Corruption_Eff_xN18AoJ.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Klein |first1=Brian |last2=Zhu |first2=Annah |last3=Pardo-Herrera |first3=Camilo |last4=Mullard |first4=Saul |title=Enrolling the Local: Community-Based Anti-Corruption Efforts and Institutional Capture |publisher=WWF International |date=February 2021 |url=https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/133/42u8x4v659_Topic_Brief_Enrolling_the_Local_Community_Based_Anti_Corruption_Eff_xN18AoJ.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{klein2021enrolling, author = {Klein, Brian and Zhu, Annah and Pardo-Herrera, Camilo and Mullard, Saul}, title = {{Enrolling the Local: Community-Based Anti-Corruption Efforts and Institutional Capture}}, institution = {WWF International}, year = {2021}, month = feb, url = {https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/133/42u8x4v659_Topic_Brief_Enrolling_the_Local_Community_Based_Anti_Corruption_Eff_xN18AoJ.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }