Expanding the Playing Field: Nike’s World Shoe Project (A)

In 1998, Nike launched the World Shoe Project to target emerging markets in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, with a primary focus on China. The project utilized a 'local-for-local' manufacturing model and a 'design-for-manufacture' approach to create affordable shoes, such as the Series 100 priced at $15. Despite these innovations, by January 2001, sales failed to meet expectations due to rigid corporate profit margin requirements, a distribution network geared toward high-end urban retail, and the absence of a dedicated marketing strategy. The company faced stiff competition from local Chinese brands like Li Ning and Kangwei, which had better market penetration and lower price points.

• Nike implemented a 'local-for-local' manufacturing strategy for the World Shoe Project, which involved using domestic materials and existing Chinese factory networks to reduce transportation costs, eliminate import duties, and comply with Chinese government regulations requiring local sourcing for local sales.
• The World Shoe Project utilized a 'design-for-manufacture' approach, co-designing shoes with Asian engineers to reduce costs and waste. This included a 'pillar cushioning' midsole, the original 'Waffle' outsole, and the replacement of traditional cardboard boxes with reusable drawstring bags.
• Despite the low-cost design, the World Shoe failed to compete with local Chinese brands because Nike applied its standard corporate pricing formulas and rigid profit margin expectations to the product, making it overpriced compared to local competitors whose prices ranged from $3 to $30.
• Nike's distribution infrastructure in China was inadequate for the World Shoe's target segment, as it relied on channels serving major metropolitan areas like Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou, whereas the mass market was served by approximately 9 million small, independent 'mom-and-pop' stores.
• The company faced significant competition from local Chinese brands, specifically Li Ning and Kangwei. Li Ning, in particular, outperformed Nike in channel penetration with 800 points of sale compared to Nike's 388, and achieved higher average revenues per location.
• The World Shoe Project suffered from a lack of strategic marketing and organizational friction, as the product was placed in existing retail channels without a dedicated promotion plan, and managers were incentivized to prioritize higher-margin products over the low-margin World Shoe.
• Nike's rigid monthly ordering policy, requiring a minimum of 2,000 pairs per style and a 3-month production commitment, created forecasting failures that prevented the company from meeting spikes in demand, such as during the 1999 Chinese New Year.

APA

McDonald, H., & London, T. (2002). Expanding the Playing Field: Nike’s World Shoe Project (A). World Resources Institute. https://pdf.wri.org/bell/case_1-56973-539-5_full_version_a_english.pdf

Chicago

McDonald, Heather, and Ted London. Expanding the Playing Field: Nike’s World Shoe Project (A). World Resources Institute, 2002. https://pdf.wri.org/bell/case_1-56973-539-5_full_version_a_english.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=McDonald |first1=Heather |last2=London |first2=Ted |title=Expanding the Playing Field: Nike’s World Shoe Project (A) |publisher=World Resources Institute |date=2002 |url=https://pdf.wri.org/bell/case_1-56973-539-5_full_version_a_english.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{mcdonald2002expanding, author = {McDonald, Heather and London, Ted}, title = {{Expanding the Playing Field: Nike’s World Shoe Project (A)}}, institution = {World Resources Institute}, year = {2002}, url = {https://pdf.wri.org/bell/case_1-56973-539-5_full_version_a_english.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }