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Paying For Environmental Performance: Using Reverse Auctions to Allocate Funding For Conservation

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This policy note describes the use of reverse auctions as a cost-effective mechanism for allocating funding within agricultural conservation or environmental trading programs, specifically highlighting the Conestoga Reverse Auction Project in Pennsylvania.

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  • Reverse auctions serve as competitive bidding systems where sellers compete to provide buyers with specific goods or services, which ensures that conservation funding is used to purchase cost-effective environmental improvements.
  • The Conestoga Reverse Auction Project in Pennsylvania utilized a reverse auction to distribute funding for Best Management Practices or agricultural conservation based on the capacity to reduce phosphorus losses.
  • Reverse auctions can be applied to allocate funding in environmental trading programs or agricultural conservation programs that operate with limited or constrained budgets, including US Farm Bill Conservation Programs.

Cite the original document

APA
World Resources Institute (n.d.). Paying For Environmental Performance: Using Reverse Auctions to Allocate Funding For Conservation. https://www.wri.org/research/paying-environmental-performance-using-reverse-auctions-allocate-funding-conservation
Chicago
World Resources Institute. Paying For Environmental Performance: Using Reverse Auctions to Allocate Funding For Conservation. n.d. https://www.wri.org/research/paying-environmental-performance-using-reverse-auctions-allocate-funding-conservation.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=World Resources Institute |title=Paying For Environmental Performance: Using Reverse Auctions to Allocate Funding For Conservation |url=https://www.wri.org/research/paying-environmental-performance-using-reverse-auctions-allocate-funding-conservation |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{worldresourcesinstitutendpaying, author = {{World Resources Institute}}, title = {{Paying For Environmental Performance: Using Reverse Auctions to Allocate Funding For Conservation}}, institution = {World Resources Institute}, url = {https://www.wri.org/research/paying-environmental-performance-using-reverse-auctions-allocate-funding-conservation}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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