Paying For Environmental Performance: Using Reverse Auctions to Allocate Funding For Conservation

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The document describes the application of reverse auctions—competitive bidding systems where sellers compete to provide services—to ensure cost-effective environmental improvements. It specifically highlights the Conestoga Reverse Auction Project in Pennsylvania, which used this mechanism to allocate funding for agricultural conservation and Best Management Practices aimed at reducing phosphorus losses.

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  • Reverse auctions function as competitive bidding systems that allow buyers to purchase cost-effective environmental improvements by having sellers compete to supply a specified good or service.
  • The Conestoga Reverse Auction Project in Pennsylvania demonstrated the use of reverse auctions to distribute funding for agricultural conservation or Best Management Practices specifically to reduce phosphorus losses.

Cite the original document

APA
World Resources Institute (n.d.). Paying For Environmental Performance: Using Reverse Auctions to Allocate Funding For Conservation. https://www.wri.org/research/paying-environmental-performance-using-reverse-auctions-allocate-funding-conservation
Chicago
World Resources Institute. Paying For Environmental Performance: Using Reverse Auctions to Allocate Funding For Conservation. n.d. https://www.wri.org/research/paying-environmental-performance-using-reverse-auctions-allocate-funding-conservation.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=World Resources Institute |title=Paying For Environmental Performance: Using Reverse Auctions to Allocate Funding For Conservation |url=https://www.wri.org/research/paying-environmental-performance-using-reverse-auctions-allocate-funding-conservation |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{worldresourcesinstitutendpaying, author = {{World Resources Institute}}, title = {{Paying For Environmental Performance: Using Reverse Auctions to Allocate Funding For Conservation}}, institution = {World Resources Institute}, url = {https://www.wri.org/research/paying-environmental-performance-using-reverse-auctions-allocate-funding-conservation}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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