Federalism in the Greenhouse
Summary
The document examines the tension between state-led and federal-led climate legislation, proposing a hybrid model for a federal cap-and-trade program. It argues that explicitly providing a mechanism for state action in federal law is necessary to maintain incentives for state-level innovation and emissions reductions while avoiding the business challenges associated with fragmented state-by-state regulation.
Key insights
- A hybrid approach to climate legislation is recommended to leverage the strengths of both state and federal governments, as it allows for continued state innovation while maintaining substantial nationwide uniformity.
- Failure to include a mechanism for state action within federal cap-and-trade law could lead the federal government to accidentally diminish or remove the incentives for states to pursue strong policies that support federal goals.
- Designing a role for states in a federal cap-and-trade system requires balancing the benefits of state-driven innovation and emissions reductions against the regulatory challenges that a patchwork of state laws creates for businesses.
Cite the original document
- APA
- World Resources Institute (n.d.). Federalism in the Greenhouse. https://www.wri.org/research/federalism-greenhouse
- Chicago
- World Resources Institute. Federalism in the Greenhouse. n.d. https://www.wri.org/research/federalism-greenhouse.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |author=World Resources Institute |title=Federalism in the Greenhouse |url=https://www.wri.org/research/federalism-greenhouse |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{worldresourcesinstitutendfederalism, author = {{World Resources Institute}}, title = {{Federalism in the Greenhouse}}, institution = {World Resources Institute}, url = {https://www.wri.org/research/federalism-greenhouse}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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