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The report analyzes the testing history of the Ground-based Midcourse (GMD) missile defense system, highlighting a low success rate and a lack of tests against realistic ICBM-range targets, salvo modes, and multiple targets. It notes that both CE-I and CE-II interceptors were deployed before successful intercept demonstrations and compares GMD's slow testing pace and high costs to the more rigorous testing of the Aegis BMD and THAAD systems.

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  • The GMD testing program is characterized by a low success rate and a slow pace of execution. Since September 2006, the rate for operationally configured interceptors has been approximately 0.75 tests per year, with only 3 of 7 such tests resulting in successful intercepts.
  • The GMD system has not been tested against realistic operational scenarios, including ICBM-range targets (greater than 5,500 km), salvo mode firing (multiple interceptors at one target), or multiple simultaneous targets.
  • Both CE-I and CE-II Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) were deployed into operational silos years before they achieved a successful intercept test, contradicting standard 'intercept-before-you-buy-and-deploy' practices seen in other systems like THAAD.
  • Testing conditions have been limited and unrepresentative, with almost all successful tests occurring while targets were illuminated by the sun and using targets with countermeasures that were either simple or failed to deploy.
  • Technical failures in the CE-II kill vehicle, specifically a design flaw in the inertial measurement unit sensitive to vibrations, delayed the demonstration of intercept capability by over six years and cost at least $1.98 billion to resolve.
  • The high cost of GMD tests, which often exceed $200 million per attempt and can reach $360 million following failures, is a primary factor limiting the frequency of testing.

Cite the original document

APA
Union of Concerned Scientists (2016). Shielded from Oversight. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-appendix-7.pdf
Chicago
Union of Concerned Scientists. Shielded from Oversight. 2016. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-appendix-7.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Union of Concerned Scientists |title=Shielded from Oversight |date=July 2016 |url=https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-appendix-7.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{unionofconcernedscientists2016shielded, author = {{Union of Concerned Scientists}}, title = {{Shielded from Oversight}}, institution = {Union of Concerned Scientists}, year = {2016}, month = jul, url = {https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-appendix-7.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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