Securing the Skies
Summary
The report identifies growing risks to the space environment, including space debris and the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, which threaten critical civil, commercial, and military infrastructure. It argues that unilateral 'space dominance' is unrealistic and counterproductive, advocating instead for international cooperation, transparency, and a shift toward 'smart planning' to ensure mission assurance. The authors propose ten steps for the Obama administration, including pledging not to be the first to station weapons in space, modifying restrictive export controls, and establishing a high-level expert panel to improve space situational awareness.
Key insights
- The space environment is increasingly crowded and hazardous, with over 21,000 pieces of debris larger than 10 centimeters tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN). This crowding increases the risk of collisions, which can occur every two to three years between active satellites and debris larger than a marble.
- Existing international legal frameworks, primarily the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), are inadequate for contemporary challenges because they do not explicitly prohibit deliberate ASAT attacks or the testing of ASAT weapons.
- The pursuit of 'space dominance' through the development of space-based weapons is deemed unrealistic and counterproductive. Space-based ground-attack weapons are estimated to be 50 to 100 times more expensive than ground-based alternatives with similar delivery times.
- U.S. export controls on space technology, particularly those mandated by the 1999 Defense Authorization Act, have harmed the U.S. commercial satellite industry and hindered scientific collaboration, leading to a loss of market share.
- The report recommends a 'capability-preserving strategy' to reduce satellite vulnerability. This includes hardening electronics, building redundancy, distributing functions across satellite clusters, and developing air- or ground-based backup systems to ensure 'mission assurance'.
- The authors argue that the U.S. should pledge not to be the first to station dedicated weapons in space and should not develop space-based ballistic missile defense interceptors, as these would be seen as offensive and could spur an arms race.
- Improving Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is critical for traffic management and verification of agreements. The report suggests the U.S. should improve sensor coverage in the southern hemisphere and increase data sharing with partner states.
- The report suggests that the U.S. should implement transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs), such as providing a comprehensive top-line budget for military space expenditures and improving prelaunch notifications.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Grego, L., & Wright, D. (2010). Securing the Skies. Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf
- Chicago
- Grego, Laura, and David Wright. Securing the Skies. Union of Concerned Scientists, 2010. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Grego |first1=Laura |last2=Wright |first2=David |title=Securing the Skies |publisher=Union of Concerned Scientists |date=November 2010 |url=https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{grego2010securing, author = {Grego, Laura and Wright, David}, title = {{Securing the Skies}}, institution = {Union of Concerned Scientists}, year = {2010}, month = nov, url = {https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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