The Risk of Nuclear War with China

The report argues that the United States and China are caught in a cycle of military preparation and mutual mistrust that increases the risk of nuclear war. It highlights a fundamental mismatch in strategic thinking: the U.S. considers the first use of nuclear weapons a possible contingency to stop conventional conflict, while China focuses on maintaining a credible retaliatory capability to deter such attacks. This psychological contest drives an arms race in conventional precision-strike weapons, missile defenses, and anti-satellite capabilities. The author warns that a lack of urgency among officials to address these risks, combined with the potential for technical errors or miscalculations, could lead to an inadvertent nuclear exchange.

• The United States and China are engaged in a psychological contest and arms race driven by mismatched perceptions of nuclear utility. The U.S. seeks the ability to threaten nuclear escalation to prevent or determine the outcome of a conventional war, whereas China aims to fight a conventional war under conditions of nuclear deterrence, ensuring that nuclear weapons are effectively 'off the table'.
• The U.S. is investing heavily in nuclear modernization, including a planned expenditure of over one trillion dollars for force upgrades and several hundred billion dollars for the nuclear weapons complex. This includes the development of 'tailored nuclear components' like the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile and a redesigned B61 gravity bomb, intended for use in a potential conflict with China.
• China is countering U.S. military advantages—specifically missile defenses, precision-strike weapons, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities—by diversifying its missile basing modes, increasing warhead numbers, and developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to disable U.S. satellites.
• There is a significant risk of inadvertent nuclear war due to potential miscalculations or technical failures. Specific dangers include the PRC moving to a 'launch on warning' posture, which increases the risk of false alarms, or either nation mistaking a conventional missile strike for a nuclear attack.
• Diplomatic efforts to manage strategic stability are insufficient. While military-to-military exchanges have produced memoranda of understanding on naval and aircraft conduct, strategic dialogues regarding nuclear forces and missile defenses remain perfunctory, and the U.S. has rejected a 'no-first-use' policy.
• A troubling lack of urgency exists among high-level officials in both nations. Some U.S. and PRC experts dismiss the possibility of a nuclear exchange as nearly impossible, despite increasing military posturing in areas like the Scarborough Shoal.

APA

Kulacki, G. (2016). The Risk of Nuclear War with China. Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf

Chicago

Kulacki, Gregory. The Risk of Nuclear War with China. Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Kulacki |first1=Gregory |title=The Risk of Nuclear War with China |publisher=Union of Concerned Scientists |date=May 2016 |url=https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{kulacki2016risk, author = {Kulacki, Gregory}, title = {{The Risk of Nuclear War with China}}, institution = {Union of Concerned Scientists}, year = {2016}, month = may, url = {https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }