U.S. Nuclear Power Safety One Year after Fukushima

One year after the Fukushima disaster, the Union of Concerned Scientists argues that U.S. nuclear reactors remain vulnerable to severe natural disasters and terrorist attacks. While the NRC has proposed safeguards, the document claims the agency is moving too slowly and has deprioritized the most critical recommendation: clarifying the regulatory framework for 'beyond-design-basis' accidents. Furthermore, the nuclear industry's voluntary 'FLEX' program is criticized for purchasing equipment before the NRC has established necessary safety and reliability guidelines.

• U.S. nuclear reactors share design and emergency response similarities with the Fukushima reactors, making them vulnerable to severe natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Specifically, 23 U.S. reactors have hardened vent systems that, like those in Japan, require electrical power to operate and thus may fail during a station blackout.
• The NRC's Near-Term Task Force issued 12 recommendations in July 2011, categorized into three tiers of priority. However, the NRC is criticized for relegating the first and primary recommendationto clarify the 'patchwork' regulatory framework for 'beyond-design-basis' accidentsto the lowest priority, which the document argues creates uncertainty for the implementation of the other 11 recommendations.
• Equipment installed after 9/11 to protect against station blackouts from aircraft attacks may not survive natural disasters because it was not required to meet high standards of quality or be protected from earthquakes and flooding.
• The nuclear industry's voluntary 'Diverse and Flexible Coping Capability' (FLEX) program involves dispersing non-hardened equipment across various locations. The document argues the industry is 'jumping the gun' by purchasing equipment before the NRC defines 'reasonable protection' guidelines, potentially making it politically difficult for the NRC to mandate higher standards later.
• The NRC has deferred action on three specific recommendations from the Union of Concerned Scientists by placing them in Tier 3: the enlargement of emergency evacuation zones, the expansion of potassium iodide distribution, and the accelerated transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry casks.

APA

Lochbaum, D., & Lyman, E. (2012). U.S. Nuclear Power Safety One Year after Fukushima. Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Fukushima-anniversary-summary.pdf

Chicago

Lochbaum, David, and Edwin Lyman. U.S. Nuclear Power Safety One Year after Fukushima. Union of Concerned Scientists, 2012. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Fukushima-anniversary-summary.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Lochbaum |first1=David |last2=Lyman |first2=Edwin |title=U.S. Nuclear Power Safety One Year after Fukushima |publisher=Union of Concerned Scientists |date=March 2012 |url=https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Fukushima-anniversary-summary.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{lochbaum2012nuclear, author = {Lochbaum, David and Lyman, Edwin}, title = {{U.S. Nuclear Power Safety One Year after Fukushima}}, institution = {Union of Concerned Scientists}, year = {2012}, month = mar, url = {https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Fukushima-anniversary-summary.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }