Energislukare i knipa – Kinas position i klimatförhandlingarna

The document examines China's balancing act in climate negotiations, where it seeks to maintain economic growth and energy security while transitioning toward a low-carbon economy. While China has implemented ambitious domestic policies to reduce energy intensity—driven largely by a need to decrease dependence on oil and coal imports—it remains cautious about committing to binding international targets that could undermine its development goals or subject its internal affairs to international verification. The briefing highlights the critical role of the US-China relationship and the necessity of financial and technical support from developed nations to accelerate China's emission peak.

• China's drive for ambitious climate policy is primarily motivated by energy security, as the country faces increasing dependence on imports for oil and coal. Oil import dependency is projected to rise to nearly 80 percent by 2030, and coal imports are expected to cover 10–20 percent of consumption within two decades.
• China is a dominant source of global emissions, accounting for nearly 25 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions and 20 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions. Since 2000, China has been responsible for 57 percent of the growth rate in global emissions.
• Domestic policy targets include reducing energy intensity by 20 percent during the eleventh five-year program (2006–2010), with similar goals intended through 2020. Additionally, China plans to increase the share of renewable energy to 10 percent by 2010 and 15 percent by 2020.
• China's international negotiating position is a balance between asserting the rights of developing nations to receive financial and technical support and wanting to lead in the new low-carbon economy. It demands binding commitments from developed nations, specifically requesting that the US reduce emissions by 25 to 40 percent from 1990 levels.
• There is a significant gap between China's domestic ambitions and its willingness to accept international binding commitments, largely due to fears that international verification would be an interference in internal affairs.
• While some international models suggest China's emissions must peak by 2020 to meet the two-degree target, a 2009 report by Chinese researchers suggests a peak in 2030. However, officials have indicated that increased funding and technology transfer from rich countries could move this peak earlier.

APA

Hallding, K. (n.d.). Energislukare i knipa – Kinas position i klimatförhandlingarna. Stockholm Environment Institute. https://www.sei.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate-mitigation-adaptation/Economics_of_climate_policy/energislukare-i-knipa-kinas-position.pdf

Chicago

Hallding, Karl. Energislukare i knipa – Kinas position i klimatförhandlingarna. Stockholm Environment Institute, n.d. https://www.sei.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate-mitigation-adaptation/Economics_of_climate_policy/energislukare-i-knipa-kinas-position.pdf.

Wikipedia

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BibTeX

@techreport{halldingndenergislukare, author = {Hallding, Karl}, title = {{Energislukare i knipa – Kinas position i klimatförhandlingarna}}, institution = {Stockholm Environment Institute}, url = {https://www.sei.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate-mitigation-adaptation/Economics_of_climate_policy/energislukare-i-knipa-kinas-position.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }