BRICS XV: Expectations for South Africa’s 2023 chair

The document examines South Africa's position within BRICS ahead of its 2023 chairship, highlighting the tension between its democratic values and the geopolitics of larger members like Russia and China. It evaluates the success of 'multi-track diplomacy' through institutions like the New Development Bank and the BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre, while noting that domestic crises—including energy instability and economic recovery—hinder South Africa's ability to fully leverage the partnership for national growth.

• South Africa faces a strategic risk of being subsumed by the geopolitics of larger BRICS members, particularly as China and Russia face international censure. This creates a tension between South Africa's 'pragmatic non-alignment' and its stated commitment to human rights and democracy.
• Domestic challenges in South Africa, including political infighting, bureaucratic inefficiency, and severe electricity generation uncertainty, act as bottlenecks that impede the implementation of national growth agendas and economic recovery plans like Operation Vulindlela.
• The New Development Bank (NDB) is cited as a successful institutional model for BRICS, providing a practical alternative for development finance and demonstrating the synergy of multi-track diplomacy by integrating government policy, business suppliers, and academic commentary.
• The BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre, launched in March 2022, represents a tangible achievement of the 2018 Johannesburg Declaration, utilizing a virtual infrastructure to coordinate research between national centres in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
• While government-to-government (track 1) diplomacy is easier to track, 'people-to-people' exchanges (tracks 2 and 3) are hindered by language barriers and a lack of sustainable platforms for civil society and NGO coordination.
• Russia's war in Ukraine has negatively impacted South Africa through skyrocketing fuel costs, increased food prices, and disrupted agricultural trade channels, while simultaneously threatening food security across the broader African continent due to fertilizer inflation.
• South Africa has the potential to serve as a 'gateway' or logistics hub for BRICS into Africa, aligning with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and NEPAD's infrastructure campaign, although the practical implications of the AfCFTA remain vague.

APA

Muresan, A. (2023). BRICS XV: Expectations for South Africa’s 2023 chair. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/SAIIA_PI-141_BRICSXVExpectations.pdf

Chicago

Muresan, Arina. BRICS XV: Expectations for South Africa’s 2023 chair. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2023. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/SAIIA_PI-141_BRICSXVExpectations.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Muresan |first1=Arina |title=BRICS XV: Expectations for South Africa’s 2023 chair |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=February 2023 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/SAIIA_PI-141_BRICSXVExpectations.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{muresan2023brics, author = {Muresan, Arina}, title = {{BRICS XV: Expectations for South Africa’s 2023 chair}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2023}, month = feb, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/SAIIA_PI-141_BRICSXVExpectations.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }