Natural Resource Governance, Boom and Bust: The Case of Kolwezi in the DRC

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The document examines the cyclical nature of the copper and cobalt mining industries in Kolwezi, DRC, and how these fluctuations affect governance, social stability, and the environment. It highlights the state's weak capacity to manage mineral wealth, the tensions between industrial mining companies and artisanal miners, and the devastating socio-economic impact of the 2008 commodity price collapse.

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  • The Congolese state possesses a weak capacity to manage its mineral wealth and is ill-equipped to handle the challenges or opportunities presented by commodity market fluctuations.
  • The 2004–2008 commodities boom led to a 'conflation of private and state policing' in mining regions, where the government used police to assist private security firms in expelling artisanal miners from company-owned properties.
  • The 2008 commodity price collapse severely impacted artisanal miners, with copper prices falling from over $4.00/lb in mid-2008 to just over $1.00/lb by the end of the year, and cobalt falling from $50/lb to under $20/lb.
  • The economic downturn of 2008 led to widespread loss of income for an estimated 300,000 informal miners in Katanga province and forced many smaller mining companies to cease operations.
  • Environmental and social regulation in Kolwezi is dysfunctional; while companies must submit impact plans, the national Ministry of Mines in Kinshasa rarely shares these with local divisions or conducts site visits to verify implementation.
  • A complex web of shared interests and conflicts of interest exists between private mining capital and the Congolese political elite, with some politicians serving as directors on company boards.
  • Taxation in the mining sector is characterized by a lack of transparency and corruption, exemplified by the '1/3, 1/3, 1/3 rule' where revenues are split between the state, a corrupt official, and the company.
  • The relocation site for artisanal miners at Kawama fails to meet international human rights guidelines, lacking essential services such as schools and running water.
  • Since 2006, there has been an increasing trend of the Congolese government using covert state security forces, such as the Republican Guards and the ANR, to silence political opponents.

Cite the original document

APA
Mthembu-Salter, G. (2009). Natural Resource Governance, Boom and Bust: The Case of Kolwezi in the DRC. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Occasional-Paper-35.pdf
Chicago
Mthembu-Salter, Gregory. Natural Resource Governance, Boom and Bust: The Case of Kolwezi in the DRC. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2009. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Occasional-Paper-35.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Mthembu-Salter |first1=Gregory |title=Natural Resource Governance, Boom and Bust: The Case of Kolwezi in the DRC |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=June 2009 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Occasional-Paper-35.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{mthembusalter2009natural, author = {Mthembu-Salter, Gregory}, title = {{Natural Resource Governance, Boom and Bust: The Case of Kolwezi in the DRC}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2009}, month = jun, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Occasional-Paper-35.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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