SOUTH AFRICA AND SECONDARY POWERS: CONTESTATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The paper investigates the dynamics between South Africa, as a regional hegemon, and several 'secondary powers' in sub-Saharan Africa. It concludes that while these states possess significant material power, their ability to contest South African leadership is limited by poor governance and a lack of overlapping strategic interests. Most contestation is found to be unintended, with the exception of Angola, which employs a strategy of soft balancing through economic protectionism and strategic investments.

• Contestation in sub-Saharan Africa is frequently unintended, meaning that while the policies of secondary powers may undermine South Africa's position, they are not specifically designed for that purpose.
• Angola has transitioned from unintended contestation to a strategy of soft balancing, characterized by its refusal to join the SADC free trade area and the use of the state-owned oil company, Sonangol, to expand economic influence and create alternatives to South African transport hubs.
• Nigeria's economic diplomacy is primarily driven by domestic development and poverty reduction rather than a deliberate strategy to challenge South Africa, qualifying it as unintended soft balancing.
• Kenya possesses the potential for economic contestation against South Africa, particularly regarding the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) and competition for East African markets, though it has not yet fully unleashed this potential.
• Ethiopia and Sudan do not contest against South Africa; Ethiopia's interests in the Horn of Africa do not overlap with South Africa's, and Sudan's foreign policy remains largely reactive to its own internal instability.
• The ability of secondary powers to transform their material economic and military capabilities into effective regional influence is severely hampered by high levels of corruption and government ineffectiveness.
• Material power assessments show that while Nigeria has a larger GDP than South Africa and Angola has higher defence spending, South Africa remains the primary hegemon due to superior governance and a more balanced power profile.

APA

SCHOLVIN, S. (2017). SOUTH AFRICA AND SECONDARY POWERS: CONTESTATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Occasional-Paper-270.pdf

Chicago

SCHOLVIN, SÖREN. SOUTH AFRICA AND SECONDARY POWERS: CONTESTATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2017. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Occasional-Paper-270.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=SCHOLVIN |first1=SÖREN |title=SOUTH AFRICA AND SECONDARY POWERS: CONTESTATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=September 2017 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Occasional-Paper-270.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{scholvin2017south, author = {SCHOLVIN, SÖREN}, title = {{SOUTH AFRICA AND SECONDARY POWERS: CONTESTATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2017}, month = sep, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Occasional-Paper-270.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }