Islamic State Expands Reach in Sahel

A policy brief detailing the rapid expansion of the Islamic State–Sahel Province (IS-SP) between 2019 and 2026. It highlights a significant increase in manpower, the adoption of structured governance in Mali, and the first use of combat drones in a January 2026 attack on Niamey's airport. The report attributes this growth to the collapse of regional security following coups in the Sahel, rivalry with al-Qaeda's JNIM, and strategic guidance from IS Core.

• On 29 January 2026, Islamic State–Sahel Province (IS-SP) attacked Diori Hamani International Airport and Air Base 101 in Niamey, Niger. This event marked the first time the group used drones in direct combat and highlighted the vulnerability of state infrastructure.
• IS-SP experienced rapid growth between 2019 and 2025, increasing its manpower by 1,400% to approximately 3,000 personnel by 2024. This growth allowed it to operationally outperform the Islamic State–West Africa Province (IS-WAP) and become one of the deadliest IS affiliates globally.
• The rivalry between IS-SP and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) escalated into full-scale competition after 2019. Violence increased significantly, with a 40% rise in attacks on civilians in Mali in 2022 and a 50% overall increase in violence among all conflict parties in 2023 compared to 2021. In November 2025, IS-SP killed over 60 JNIM militants in northeast Burkina Faso.
• IS-SP has evolved its strategy from ethnic-based targeting to structured territorial governance, particularly in Mali's eastern Menaka region. This approach includes managing health services, economic control, and using Islamic courts for dispute resolution, which resulted in IS-SP-controlled territory in Mali doubling by mid-2023.
• The expansion of IS-SP has been facilitated by the collapse of regional security architecture following coups d'état between 2021 and 2023 and the withdrawal of French counterterrorism troops after the 2021 Malian coup. Additionally, Niger's 2025 exit from the Multinational Joint Task Force has hindered intelligence sharing and counterterrorism operations along the Niger–Nigeria border.
• There is evidence of transnational threats and inter-affiliate cooperation. IS Core has reportedly established transit corridors from southern Europe to the Sahel for foreign terrorist fighters, and Moroccan security operations between 2023 and 2025 disrupted the relocation of these fighters to Mali. Furthermore, the use of drones by IS-SP in Niamey suggests assistance from the more advanced IS-WAP.

APA

Kumanina, K. (2026). Islamic State Expands Reach in Sahel. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SAIIA_PB-318_IslamicStateExpandsReach.pdf

Chicago

Kumanina, Ksenia. Islamic State Expands Reach in Sahel. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2026. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SAIIA_PB-318_IslamicStateExpandsReach.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Kumanina |first1=Ksenia |title=Islamic State Expands Reach in Sahel |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=April 2026 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SAIIA_PB-318_IslamicStateExpandsReach.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{kumanina2026islamic, author = {Kumanina, Ksenia}, title = {{Islamic State Expands Reach in Sahel}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2026}, month = apr, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SAIIA_PB-318_IslamicStateExpandsReach.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }