What Role for South Africa in EPAs and Regional Economic Integration?

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The research argues that EU-mandated reciprocity in EPAs risks splintering SADC by creating divergent trade policies among member states. Analysis shows that products the non-South African members of SACU (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland) would likely wish to exclude from liberalisation are already being liberalised under the TDCA, potentially undermining their ability to set autonomous trade schedules. The authors suggest that expanding SACU, possibly to include Mozambique, could serve as a mechanism to neutralise the anti-regionalism bias of EPAs.

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  • The authors argue that EU pressure for EPAs creates a significant risk of fracturing the Southern African Development Community (SADC), potentially leading to a scenario where some countries join different EPAs while others remain outside, thereby reinforcing internal borders.
  • Research across sub-Saharan African regions indicates very little natural overlap in the products countries would choose to exclude from liberalisation; in most regions, over half of a country's exclusion basket is absent from the lists of its regional partners.
  • For the non-South African members of SACU (BLNS), the analysis reveals that almost all products they would likely seek to exclude from an EPA are already being liberalised under the TDCA, which may thwart their ability to develop autonomous exclusion schedules.
  • Specific data for BLNS states shows high overlap with TDCA liberalisation: in Botswana, 144 of 225 potential exclusions will be fully liberalised by 2012; in Lesotho, 56 of 98; in Namibia, 330 of 485; and in Swaziland, 84 of 120.
  • The paper suggests that 'retro-fitting' the TDCA to grant specific preferences to BLNS (such as for sugar, beef, and citrus) that are not available to South Africa is logistically feasible because separate systems for these exports already exist.
  • The authors propose expanding SACU, specifically mentioning Mozambique, as a way to counter the anti-regionalism of EPAs, noting that enlargement would generally have positive revenue effects for existing members.

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APA
Stevens, C., & Kennan, J. (2005). What Role for South Africa in EPAs and Regional Economic Integration? South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/SAIIA-Nov-2005.pdf
Chicago
Stevens, Christopher, and Jane Kennan. What Role for South Africa in EPAs and Regional Economic Integration? South African Institute of International Affairs, 2005. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/SAIIA-Nov-2005.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Stevens |first1=Christopher |last2=Kennan |first2=Jane |title=What Role for South Africa in EPAs and Regional Economic Integration? |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=November 2005 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/SAIIA-Nov-2005.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{stevens2005what, author = {Stevens, Christopher and Kennan, Jane}, title = {{What Role for South Africa in EPAs and Regional Economic Integration?}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2005}, month = nov, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/SAIIA-Nov-2005.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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